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ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: SIMULATING AND OPTIMIZING:
MILITARY MANPOWER MODELING AND
MOUNTAIN RANGE OPTIONS
Andrew O. Hall, Ph.D. Candidate, 2009
Dissertation directed by: Professor Michael Fu
In this dissertation we employ two different optimization methodologies, dy-
namic programming and linear programming, and stochastic simulation. The first
two essays are drawn from military manpower modeling and the last is an application
in finance.
First, we investigate two different models to explore the military manpower
system. The first model describes the optimal retirement behavior for an Army
officer from any point in their career. We address the optimal retirement policies for
Army officers, incorporating the current retirement system, pay tables, and Army
promotion opportunities. We find that the optimal policy for taste-neutral Lieu-
tenant Colonels is to retire at 20 years. We demonstrate the value and importance
of promotion signals regarding the promotion distribution to Colonel. Signaling an
increased promotion opportunity from 50% to 75% for the most competitive officers
switches their optimal policy at twenty years to continuing to serve and competing
for promotion to Colonel.
The second essay explores the attainability and sustainability of Army force
profiles. We propose a new network structure that incorporates both rank and
years in grade to combine cohort, rank, and specialty modeling without falling into
the common pitfalls of small cell size and uncontrollable end effects. This is the
first implementation of specialty modeling in a manpower model for U.S. Army
officers. Previous specialty models of the U.S. Army manpower system have isolated
accession planning for Second Lieutenants and the Career Field Designation process
for Majors, but this is the first integration of rank and specialty modeling over the
entire officer’s career and development of an optimal force profile.
The last application is drawn from financial engineering and explores several
exotic derivatives that are collectively known Mountain Range options, employing
Monte Carlo simulation to price these options and developing gradient estimates
to study the sensitivities to underlying parameters, known as “the Greeks”. We
find that IPA and LR/SF methods are efficient methods of gradient estimation for
Mountain Range products at a considerably reduced computation cost compared
with the commonly used finite difference methods.
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Management Science models problems from many diverse application areas
and also uses a diverse set of tools including those from optimization and simulation.
In this dissertation we employed two different optimization methodologies, dynamic
programming and linear programming, and gradient estimation from stochastic sim-
ulation. Two of the following three essays are drawn from the application area of
military manpower modeling and the last from financial engineering.
Management Science and Operations Management are inherently inter-disciplinary
endeavors. Increasing research in the areas of interface between Operations Man-
agement and Organizations was mentioned in Chopra et al. (2004) as part of the
way ahead for operations management in the 50th Anniversary Article for Man-
agement Science. Human resource management systems were in turn recognized in
Boudreau (2004) as an important area of organizations for the application of man-
agement science models. Here we will investigate two different models to further
explore human resource management within the military manpower system. The
first model describes optimal retirement behavior for an Army officer at any point
in their career, and the second explores the attainability and sustainability of Army
force profiles.
Simulation research has increasingly turned to Financial Engineering for appli-
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cations as financial products have become increasingly complex, especially with the
development of complex exotic derivatives and structured products that are traded
over-the-counter. Many of these products cannot be priced by analytical models,
and traders must rely on Monte Carlo simulation or other numerical methods both
for pricing as well as for hedging. We investigate several exotic derivatives, col-
lectively known Mountain Range options, using Monte Carlo simulation to price
and develop gradient estimates to study the sensitivities to underlaying parameters,
known as “the Greeks”.
1.1 Military Manpower Models
Manpower models have been employed to study human resources in the mili-
tary since the conception of military operations research (Abrams 1957). Manpower
models were created to model the type of personnel system used by the military,
but have not been restricted in application strictly to the military modeling domain.
Military manpower models have primarily been employed where the personnel sys-
tem can be modeled as a closed system with several distinct stages or ranks, and
where a predominant feature is a bar to lateral entry. In this manner, manpower
models must account for the need to grow the experienced personnel that are needed
within the system. The academic workforce has also been routinely modeled as a
multi-class manpower system, as entry is traditionally at the assistant professor
level, followed by promotions to associate professor, and finally to professor.
Manpower models have also been used to analyze assigning workers to shifts
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and other problems that address matching personnel to jobs and job scheduling.
Another early application of manpower models addressed problems within health-
care. Nurse scheduling was one of the early applications of linear programming
to job scheduling models (Warner and Prawda 1972). The assignment of interns
to hospitals has been another successful use of operations management (Roth and
Peranson 1999). Recent work by Fry et al. (2006) extends manpower modeling to
study annual staffing levels for firefighters.
One method of analyzing manpower models breaks the model into three com-
ponents: recruiting, retention and compensation. The United States Army uses
eight life cycle functions to describe human resource management: personnel struc-
ture, acquisition, distribution, development, deployment, compensation, sustain-
ment, and transition (Cashbaugh et al. 2007).
These eight functions can be grouped into the three components that are
included in much of the academic research, and we explore the inter-disciplinary
research that has been completed in regards to each of these three areas. The issues
of recruiting have been addressed in the marketing domain as well as in organizations
and behavioral psychology. The area of retention has been addressed in a majority
of manpower models, as the current workforce is the only source of experience within
the military manpower system. Labor economics has studied compensation as well
as the interface of compensation, recruiting, and retention.
Three types of mathematical models have been used in the preponderance of
operations management, operations research, and management science manpower
models. The early models were predominantly solved using dynamic programming.
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Dynamic programming papers often cited manpower models as one of the sources
of their application and motivation for the developed mathematical methods (Flynn
1975b). A second type of model is the transition-rate/Markovian manpower model.
These probabilistic models are treated both in the operations research literature as
well as the probabilistic literature. The last major type of model is linear and goal
programming. In mathematical programming the manpower system is traditionally
modeled as a network, and policy decisions are modeled using constraints on the
multiple competing components of the objective function.
A series of texts provide an introduction to manpower models from different
disciplines perspective. Wilson (1969) contains an early collection of papers and
summarizes mathematical models and military manpower systems. Bartholomew
et al. (1991) describes statistical methods for manpower planning; focusing on re-
gression, renewal and Markov models. Vajda (1978) provides a mathematical mod-
eling description of manpower planning. Edwards (1983) acknowledges the need
for additional multi-disciplinary research in manpower planning, focusing first on
technical economic models and then on behavioral models. The TIMS Studies in
Management Science series produced a 1978 special issue on manpower planning
and organizational design (Charnes et al. 1978). This special issue provides a good
introduction to the management science approach applied to manpower planning.
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1.1.1 Early Work in Military Manpower Models
There are a host of questions that arise when discussing the management deci-
sions and policies that surround manpower planning. Military manpower planning
covers the spectrum of human resource management policy in which employees enter
at an initial state and flow though the system until they are eventually a loss to
the system. The military manpower system is one where there is extremely limited
lateral entry, and the system is constrained to hire entry-level workers, and retain
experienced workers, and designed to provide the public good of defense.
Manpower models seek to answer questions of the number of personnel needed
and what skills are required for operational capabilities. This optimization is tradi-
tionally viewed as constrained to defense budgets. Thirty years have passed since
the United States transitioned from a last conscript Army to the All-Volunteer Force
(AVF) that is currently waging the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The period of
transition to the AVF was a rich time for operations research, management science
and operations management research in personnel systems for the Department of
Defense (DOD). The military roots of operations research, the immensity of defense
budgets, complexity of military systems, and the consequences of failure all encour-
age research directed at solving questions concerning how to acquire, retain and
compensate the AVF.
The transitions from peacetime overage to wartime shortages and conscription
motivated early research even before the questions arose concerning the AVF. Dailey
(1958) examined Navy re-enlistment rates finding that the re-enlistment rates for
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the Navy were amazingly consistent in total numbers, but varied considerably with
regard to the percentage of sailors that would reenlist each year. They proposed a
model with an inverse relationship between the number of sailors inducted in any
year and the reenlistment percentage. A number of reasons for the inverse relation-
ship were posed, but the model allowed a normalization of the annual percentages
and provided clear comparison across time periods. The model set standards for
evaluating the goodness of a retention year, and provided a predictive model of
re-enlistment for retaining sailors past their first enlistment.
Fisher and Morton (1967a) and Fisher and Morton (1967b) investigated reen-
listment rates for electronics personnel in the U.S. Navy. They developed a model
of operational usefulness that could compare two different possible navies based on
human resource decisions. Their model looked at the value of additional incentives
over the period of service to keep experienced technical experts in whom a consid-
erable training cost had been invested. They developed a Cobb-Douglas production
function to provide an ordinal ranking of different possible configurations, with four
distinct groups of sailors providing different amounts to the production based upon
experience, but at a corresponding increasing cost. They found that their model
was not sensitive to choice of a particular operational usefulness function, as their
results obtain for any monotonic function of the individual units operational use-
fulness. They found that myopic policies can be suboptimal, as the system falls
behind on experienced sailors if only enough sailor recruits are assessed to meet cur-
rent year demand and keep the operational usefulness above the required minimum.
They determined that enlistment and re-enlistment decisions must look forward to
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first term survival rates and the needs of the future force.
McCall and Wallace (1969) addressed the issue of re-enlistments in the Air
Force. They study the retention of electronic specialists within the Air Force and
addressed the need for monetary compensation for skills attained within the orga-
nization to avoid high retraining costs associated with low retention rates. They
found that personnel who perceived that they had a marketable skill were increas-
ingly sensitive to differences between military and civilian pay. They conducted an
empirical analysis to develop a logit model relating the probability of re-enlisting
and the difference between military and civilian pay. They also concluded that in the
absence of a draft, the enlistment decision could be modeled similarly and indicate
the importance of competitive initial pay levels for military personnel.
Flynn (1975a) created a dynamic programming model to study the issue of re-
taining productive units. The model was created to find an optimal retention policy
in units where productivity of an element is determined by age with a predetermined
retirement age for each element. His model used a linear production function similar
to previous work and incorporated a continuously increasing function of compen-
sation to balance the increased productivity with age. They find conditions under
which it is optimal to bring in just enough units at the entry level to satisfy linear
production constraints. Interestingly, the condition that allows this myopic solution
is when costs are monotonically decreasing. However, they do find policies that
are uniformly good steady state policies, and always minimize the average cost per
period. They look for policies that converge in N or fewer steps, and have a low cost
of staying at steady state. A good target state is defined such that it is minimum
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and can be reached from any state in the state space. In this manner, if a good
steady state policy exists, any steady state solution with a good target is a good
policy.
Jaquette and Nelson (1976) developed a mathematical model to determine
steady stage wage rates and the force distribution by length of service. The model
adjusts the accession and retention policies to optimize the steady state system.
Their model is a nonlinear program formulation and compares both linear and Cobb-
Douglas production functions. Gradient search methods are used to find solutions
to their model, but they were not able to prove global optimality. They make some
assumptions that have become standard in the literature: re-enlistment points at
four year intervals, twenty year career and no lateral entry. They find that lower
accessions, higher first term re-enlistment rates and slightly lower career reenlist-
ment rates are optimal policy to maximize production subject to existing budget
constraints.
The foundations of manpower modeling within operations research and man-
agement science are clearly laid out in a series of textbooks. Grinold and Marshall
(1977) covers an introduction to manpower models and Vajda (1978) addresses the
mathematics of deterministic manpower models. Bartholomew (1982) addresses
sochastic social process, of which manpower modeling is a featured example, and
Bartholomew et al. (1991) further extends statistical methods for manpower models.
In addition the manpower models presented here, another thread of research
focuses on the personnel problem: assigning individuals to tasks. The personnel
assignment problem can be modeled as a transportation problem, to assign personnel
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in each class to job categories. Tien and Kamiyama (1982) presents a survey of
methods for this variant of manpower models. Warner and Prawda (1972) presents
solutions to this variant of the assignment problem, studying the nurse scheduling
problem, which has become a standard application for this class of problem in the
literature. Green et al. (2001) provides a more recent examination of staffing issues
in hospital emergency departments.
1.1.2 Mathematical Model Classes
Gass (1991) provides a primer on military manpower models in operations
research. Although written over fifteen years ago, this work captures the types of
models currently used in production by the military, and the Army in particular.
He describes a modeling construct where individuals are aggregated by a set of
attributes and grouped into classes. Each combination of a set of attributes at each
time period represents a state. Each state will contain a number of individuals with
common attributes. His primer describes Markov transition-rate models, network
flow models, and goal-programming models.
Transition rate models require transition probabilities as an underlying as-
sumption. Given an initial distribution, Markov models answer the question of what
attributes the force will have at each phase in the planning period. When model-
ing with a transition rate model, each individual follows the same Markov process
and individuals are independent. Markov manpower models in discrete time are de-
scribed and solved in Feichtinger and Mehlmann (1976). They find existence results
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when searching for an asymptotic solution with fixed recruitment, transition proba-
bilities and initial conditions. Mehlmann (1977) extends their results to continuous
Markovian manpower models. Davies (1982) considers a model with fixed promo-
tions controlled by management. In this model the number of employees in each
stage can be modeled as independent binomial random variables. This independence
assumption facilitates calculation of one and two step transition probabilities.
Manpower models can also be modeled as a network flow. Network models
ensure conservation of flow and have the advantage of integer solutions. The models
are especially powerful when modeling systems with a limited number of character-
istics at each time period.
Goal programming is a branch of mathematical programming that uses policy
constraints as the right hand side of the programming constraints. The objective
function is created as weighted deviations from the policy goals. The goal program-
ming solutions will always be a compromise, as not all the policy objectives can
be feasibly met. Price and Piskor (1972) provide a goal programming formation
for the officer manpower system in the Canadian Forces. Price (1978) showed how
to re-formulate goal programming problems as capacitated network flow problems.
Gass et al. (1988) describes a goal programming formulation of the Army Manpower
Long-range Planning System.
Mathematical programming can expand upon network structures to add multi-
year constraints and goals to the modeling formulation. The different years have
constraints on the number of separations and promotions as well as grade, total
strength and operating strength targets. The objective function penalizes devia-
10
tions from the goals, but relies on the underlying network structure to simplify the
optimization. Current Army enlisted manpower network models have a 96-month
planning horizon, and aggregate on months of service, grade, term of service, and
gender (Cashbaugh et al. 2007).
Dynamic programming models are very popular in the operations research
literature as well as the economics literature, reflecting the interdependence of the
two disciplines. Many of the early manpower models were dynamic programming
models, and manpower modeling applications provided an interesting area of appli-
cation for expanding research in dynamic programming. Some of the early works
described earlier (Fisher and Morton 1967b,a, Flynn 1975b,a, 1979), used dynamic
programming models. The objective of deterministic dynamic programming is to
develop a steady-state policy, within the defined state space, decision space, cost
functions and transition functions. Linear and Cobb-Douglas production functions
have both been prevalent in the literature.
Gotz and McCall (1983) used Markov decision processes to analyze Air Force
officer retention. In this paper they created a model that could be used to study
the policy changes in the two main drivers of officer retention: promotion and re-
tirement policies. Officers have a different promotion system than enlisted soldiers
and do not reenlist on a four-year horizon as is assumed in many of the previous
models. They do not address nonpecuniary factors, but do find that Air Force offi-
cers make retirement decisions in a optimal sequential fashion. Their model shows
that retirement pay is the most important factor for officer retention between the
10 and 20 year marks.
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1.1.3 Research Opportunities
Manpower modeling is an important area of interdisciplinary research. We
have detailed some of the interesting articles in Operations Management, Economics,
and Management and Organizations. Many streams of research still await integra-
tion into decision-making models, for both military manpower planners and strategic
business human resource planners.
When examining the literature on manpower modeling and retention, several
clear patters are present. First, manpower modeling provides a rich field of applica-
tion for mathematical modeling. The early work in dynamic programming looked
to the manpower problem for clear links to application, and generated papers both
in the application areas as well as operations research and applied mathematical
journals.
The second observation is that changes in public policy require these previous
results to be revisited. Much of the early work was motivated by a need to move
away from conscription. The Reagan years buildups and policy changes necessitated
better models to justify increasing budgets. The downsizing of the Clinton era
provided another rich set of data to analyze the military members personnel discount
rate and the effectiveness of force-shaping tools. Within the policy arena, Rostker
(2006) provides a historical account of the development of the AVF and includes
descriptions of the studies conducted to support the policy decision surrounding its
creation. The newly published Handbook of Defense Economics has an excellent
chapter on the “New Economics of Manpower in the Post-Cold War Era” (Asch
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et al. 2007, Hartley and Sandler 2007).
The effects of several policy decisions have not yet been fully analyzed. The
full effect of the “High Three” retirement system with increasing compensation
though 40 years has not yet been explored. Another question that will need to be
addressed is the structure and compensation of the officer corps. The behavior of
the force is almost surely in flux. Within the increased operational tempo, there is a
perceived decrease in competition for promotion, and military-civilian compensation
difference. We address these questions in the second and third chapter.
In light of these timely and critically important questions, the field of man-
power modeling offers many opportunities for research. There already exists a rich
body of research, but there are many areas that need to be expanded and analyzed.
The field offers many practical problems to which analytic and empirical modeling
will produce interesting and policy influencing research. These research challenges
require the unique balance of qualitative and quantitative analysis that is aligned
within the inherently multi-disciplinary purview of Operations Management.
1.2 Simulation and Financial Engineering
The theory of asset pricing and mathematical finance has come a long way since
Louis Bachelier’s Theory of Speculation in 1900. Many of the advances have come
with the advances in computing, but the seminal works on options pricing (Merton
1973, Black and Scholes 1973) and martingale methods (Harrison and Kreps 1979),
highlight the key developments of mathematical finance, replication and martingale
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pricing. Replication and martingale pricing allow for trading strategies to perfectly
hedge a derivative in a complete market.
Vanilla options have moved from being traded over the counter, to having
established markets and a well defined theory of pricing. Options themselves are
now used along with stocks to hedge more complex derivatives and to allow risk
managers to diversify their portfolios and to balance exposure to risk. Mathematical
methods using numerical solutions to partial differential equations and Monte Carlo
simulation have emerged as the most common methods used for derivative pricing.
Developing the theory to price new assets is a fundamental goal of mathematical
finance research.
1.2.1 Gradient Estimation
In addition to developing theory to price complex assets, financial engineering
is equally interested in risk mitigation though replication and hedging. However, in
order to hedge positions, the sensitivities to market and model parameters must be
computed. Prices of vanilla puts and calls can be observed in the market, but market
sensitives must always be calculated. The need to calculate these sensitivities has
increased the use of simulation in financial engineering and provides a rich research
area for gradient estimation and variance reduction.
Fu and Hu (1995) first applied gradient estimation techniques to option pricing
focusing on IPA estimation for both European and American options. Broadie and
Glasserman (1996) applied both IPA and LR/SF methods to European and Asian
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options. Within financial engineering, Glasserman (2004) has become the standard
reference. For broader application, Fu (2006) provides an detailed survey of gradient
estimation within stochastic simulation and explains how the direct techniques are
much more efficient than “brute-force” finite difference methods. Fu (2008) provides
a more gentle introduction with a focus on application to option pricing.
Several different techniques have been employed for gradient estimation in fi-
nancial applications. The first class are indirect methods that rely on finite difference
methods, where the value of a parameter is perturbed and re-simulated. Forward
and central finite difference methods are quite easy to implement but will be biased,
in addition to requiring additional simulations.
In addition to indirect methods of gradient estimation, direct methods can
be used that tend to provide unbiased estimators and are computationally more
efficient. These methods are based upon calculating the derivative of the simulated
random variable, and vary depending on the dependency upon the parameter of in-
terest. The resulting methods can be grouped into sample or path-wise methods and
measure or distributional methods. Perturbation Analysis (PA) encompasses path-
wise methods and includes infinitesimal perturbation analysis (IPA) and smoothed
perturbation analysis (SPA) and other techniques that allow transformation using
the chain rule into two components: a sample path derivative and a derivative of
the random variable. SPA uses additional information about the stochastic pro-
cess through conditioning to increase the applicability of PA techniques. When the
parameters of interest appear in the distribution, likelihood ratio/score function
(LR/SF) or weak derivative methods are effective as these two methods focus on
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the distributional parameters. In these two methods, the derivative of a measure
must be calculated, as opposed to the derivative of the random variable as in the
PA methods.
1.3 Three Essays: Simulation and Optimization
In the following three chapters, we address two very different application areas,
and three different modeling techniques: Markov decision processes, simulation, and
mathematical programming. The first essay provides a new model of the retirement
decision made by an Army officer, obtaining optimal policies for the current com-
pensation and retirement system, as well as providing a framework within which to
evaluate proposed changes. The second essays again looks at the military manpower
system, but instead of evaluating the system from the perspective of the officer, the
model provides opportunities to optimally control the system, creating the required
pool of manpower. This facilitates exploration of several potential force profiles, by
controlling accessions, promotions, transfers and reductions, in addition to easing
two of the fundamental planning assumptions: bar to lateral entry and the up-or-out
career pattern. The third essay studies a group of over-the-counter exotic options,
Mountain Range options. Relatively little has been written about this family of
exotic options, providing an opportunity for new work studying the payoffs and
Greeks for these options.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Army Officer Retirement
2.1 Introduction
A large incentive to continued military service has historically been the gen-
erous retirement opportunities. This delayed compensation for service, even con-
sidering the potential service obligation for officers on the retired rolls, provides a
large monetary incentive for officers to serve until retirement. However, the cost of
military retirement makes changes to the retirement system a continued point of
debate. In addition to cost, the fairness of a system that cliff vests at twenty years
has been debated by Congress on numerous occassions.
Here we explore the changes to optimal retirement behavior for Army officers.
The Army is our largest service, currently authorized 532,400 soldiers, around 70,000
of which are officers. The Army must train its own officers, and has recently enacted
the first bonus for Army Officers to attempt to increase retention past the critical
ten years of service point to ensure the required strength of field grade officers.
Army Commissioned Officers are divided into three groupings: company grade,
field grade and General officers. Company grade officers specialize in direct lead-
ership at the small unit level and comprise the ranks of 2nd Lieutenant (2LT), 1st
Lieutenant (1LT) and Captain (CPT). The field grade ranks specialize in leader-
ship of larger organizations and leading and coordinating staff functions. The field
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grade ranks in the Army are Major (MAJ), Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) and Colonel
(COL). General officers are recognized both by their title and by the number of
stars they wear on their collar. General officers are the senior executives of the
Army and comprise the ranks of Brigadier General (one star), Major General (two
star), Lieutenant General (three star) and General (four star).
In a zero-sum budget game, resources that are shifted from those who serve
a full career and retire to those who leave prior to the current vesting point will
decrease compensation to those serving full careers. Such changes will not necessarily
change the decision to serve full careers, but changes to retirement and compensation
can be delicate issues. Changes to retirement and compensation must be tailored
to ensure that the changes induce the desired changes in behavior.
In this chapter we will address the optimal retirement policies for Army offi-
cers, incorporating the current retirement system, pay tables, and Army promotion
opportunities. The first two factors are common to each of the services, while the
promotion opportunities, although regulated by Congress, differ between the ser-
vices. Although the model presented here is tailored to the Army, the methodology
can be easily adapted for use by the other services.
2.1.1 Military Retirement
Many characteristics of the global environment and the military compensation
system have changed significantly in the last 25 years, yet military retirement as a
form of deferred compensation remains a powerful incentive for soldiers to stay in the
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Army. The current retirement system provides an immediate annuity after 20 years
of service, based upon the average of the soldier’s highest three years of military
compensation, a system known as the “High Three”. Soldiers who entered service
prior to 1986 are entitled to an annuity equal to 50% of their High Three while
Soldiers who entered service after 1986 are offered the choice between the existing
system or a lump sum payment at 15 years of service followed by 40% retirement
annuity. The annuities are adjusted for inflation, and increase by a percentage for
each additional year of service.
In addition to the changing retirement system, there are several other changes
which alter military compensation directly and correspondingly the retirement an-
nuity. The current military compensation system is based upon a pay table, with
increasing pay for increasing rank and years of service. The pay tables have been
significantly reworked, attempting to close a perceived pay gap between civilian pay
and military pay. Also, longevity raises have been included for some ranks out to
40 years of service. With the additional of a new pay raise for the rank of COL at
30 years, an officer would have to serve 33 years to fully realize the last pay raise in
their retirement annuity. The last pay raise for LTC is at 22 years, and correspond-
ingly is fully realized in retirement pay at 25 years. Similarly, the last pay raise for
MAJ is at 18 years, which is fully realized at 21 years of service.
The promotion opportunities have also changed for Army officers. Under the
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980, Congress established
guidelines for promotion to MAJ, LTC and COL at 80%, 70%, and 50%, respectively
(Rostker et al. 1993). At present, there is very little probability that an officer will
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not be allowed to serve as long as legally permissible. There is currently a shortage
of field grade officers, especially acute in the rank of MAJ, the rank of most officers
with ten to fifteen years of service. As a result, recent promotions rates for CPT,
MAJ and LTC are at near 100%, with the first promotion that is truly competitive is
a 50% promotion rate to COL (Henning 2006). The promotion opportunity for most
officers to COL is after 21 years of service. Current promotion rates are unlikely
to continue after the current shortage year groups created by the 1990s military
downsizing pass though the promotion windows. Decreasing promotion rates will,
however, only decrease the expected value of a military career.
Although a valuable part of the entire military compensation package, military
retirement is very expensive, and the current policy of cliff vesting at twenty years
is arguably inconsistent with current labor policies in the civilian sector. The De-
fense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation highlighted three reasons to
adjust the retirement system: inequity, inefficiency and inflexibility (DACMC 2006).
The perceived inequities are that most service members are never vested, a higher
percentage of officers become vested than enlisted soldiers, and the percentage of
enlisted members of each service that become vested vary significantly between the
services. The current system is considered inefficient because annual accrual for
retirement is 27% of basic pay, even though most service members are never vested.
The retirement system is considered inflexible because of the strong attraction for
all that serve past ten years to remain to retirement, and a service culture that is
adverse to forcing service members to leave between ten and twenty years of service.
However, before addressing additional proposed changes to the current sys-
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tem, we have to address the behavior currently induced by Army compensation.
Assuming that officers make their decisions based on optimizing their financial sta-
tus, the current system will incentivize behavior based upon the retirement system,
promotion opportunities, and pay tables. The pay tables are updated annually and
provide the base compensation by grade and years of service which is common to
all the services. In addition to monthly basic pay, Regular Military Compensation
(RMC) includes two non-taxed allowances: Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and
Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS).
2.2 Modeling Officer Decisions
The career decisions of an officer may be influenced by many factors, but
clearly economics will be a major consideration. With all the pressures of serving
as an officer, there must be some compensation that outweighs the other career
options at different stages of the officer’s career. The officer does not know how
many times they will be promoted when they are commissioned, but the uncertainty
begins to be resolved over time. In our model, the officer knows their current
rank, years in grade and years of service, and is then assumed to choose optimally
between the compensation of continuing to serve versus retiring from the military
and starting a second career. With the transition to the All Volunteer Force (AVF),
the compensation offered officers is expected to be competitive in the labor market,
both during time of peace and conflict.
Here we present a normative model of the retirement decision by an individual
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Army officer. Our model is built upon the theory of Markov Decision Processes
(MDP), using the framework of an optimal stopping problem to describe the optimal
policy regarding when an officer should retire from the Army.
2.2.1 Retirement Modeling
Modeling retirement decisions as an MDP has been employed both in research
focusing on military retirement, and on retirement problems in general. Most of the
literature in this field has created econometric discrete choice models and used panel
data to estimate model parameters. An exception is Gotz and McCall (1983), who
developed a normative model of Air Force officer retention and retirement decisions
called the Dynamic Retention Model (DRM). Their model was the first to incor-
porate rank structure into the decision making framework for military retirement
modeling. Gotz and McCall (1983) assumed that the Air Force officer knew their
promotion probability distribution and that officers were homogenous in that they
did not incorporate any non-pecuniary aspects of military compensation when they
estimated optimal retirement points.
The competing model paradigm, explained in Warner and Goldberg (1984),
focused on the modeling of enlisted personnel. The Annualized Cost of Leaving
model (ACOL) presented by Warner and Goldberg (1984) is used in their exami-
nation of the effects of sea-duty on Navy enlisted personnel. They present a model
with a single military state and examine the compensation level that would make
the sailor indifferent to leaving the Navy. They estimate taste factors, which are
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assumed to be jointly normally distributed, to explain an individual’s relative pref-
erence for military and civilian life. Black et al. (1990) adapt the model to study
the quit decisions of federal employees.
Gotz and McCall (1984) was one of the first papers to conduct structural es-
timation of a MDP or discrete choice model. Gotz and McCall (1984) estimated
differences between “rated” officers, i.e. pilots and navigators, and non-rated offi-
cers from various commissioning sources by incorporating a taste random variable,
assumed to be drawn from a extreme value distribution, to characterize each set of
officers, estimating the parameters of the DRM by maximum likelihood using Air
Force officer data from 1973 - 1977. Daula and Moffitt (1995) created a dynamic
choice model with discrete choice variables based upon the work in Gotz and McCall
(1984) to model enlisted soldier retention decisions. Their stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming model allows them to explore the differences in military and civilian pay
levels and the value of retirement for infantry soldiers, a combat specialty, who en-
listed between 1974 and 1984. They found that the perceived difference in military
and civilian pay levels had a significant effect on re-enlistment rates.
Arguden (1988) addressed questions concerning changes in the military re-
tirement system and the unintended effects on retention and work force mix with
empirical results and forecasts created using both the ACOL and the DRM cali-
brated to Air Force retention rates from 1971-1981. The model predicts that the
average service per enlistment will fall under the reduced retirement program from
6.9 years to 6.5 years, resulting in a 22 percent decrease in airmen in the 8-20 year
cohorts. They suggest that the overall attractiveness of the military with reduced
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compensation would alter the quality of personnel that are willing to stay. Having
the benefit of hindsight, this paper is prophetic of the issues the services would face
in the years after implementing the policy of a reduced retirement. Congress has
since reversed the policy after observing the retention shortfalls of the 1990s. It was
changed as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 to re-instate
the provisions of the 1980 retirement policy (Asch et al. 2002).
Asch and Warner (2001) develop an individual decision model for large hi-
erarchical organizations such as the military, focusing on several unique military
compensation features, including a much flatter compensation structure than most
large hierarchical organizations, an unusual retirement system, and an up-or-out
promotion system. Their individual decision model strives to explain why the mili-
tary deviates from standard practice in these three areas. This individual decision
model provides insight into both the level of effort and retention decisions of individ-
uals. Their results indicate that the current combination of an up-or-out promotion
system and generous retirement make the compensation package incentive compat-
ible and internally consistent without an extreme skew in compensation between
senior and junior personnel.
Related research has addressed social security, medicare and civilian retirement
decisions using dynamic programming. Rust (1987) presented a dynamic program-
ming model to describe the decision to partially or fully retire and expanded the
work to explore the effects of Social Security and Medicare on retirement decisions
in Rust and Phelan (1997). Where the previous model focused on a population
for whom social security was their only pension, Berkovec and Stern (1991) present
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another discrete choice model allowing the workers to chose to continue working,
change jobs, partially retire or fully retire, focusing on wage and pension benefits,
without including Social Security. Burkhauser et al. (2004) used a similar model to
explore the timing of application for Social Security Disability Insurance.
Our model follows the approach of Gotz and McCall (1983) in that we present
a normative model of officer retention and retirement decisions. However, changes
in the military system in the ensuing 25 years since their paper, including the “High
Three” retirement system, increasingly competitive 40 year pay tables for military
base pay, the elimination of Regular versus Reserve Active Duty commissions, and
changing career timelines and promotion opportunities, lead to a very different un-
derlying Markov chain to control the rank state in our model. Furthermore, our
model allows us to analyze the sensitivity of current officers’ decisions to personal
discount rates, promotion opportunities and taste for military service.
2.2.2 Modeling Uncertainty
Optimal stopping problems are characterized by a decision maker who observes
the current state of the system and decides whether to stop or continue. A key aspect
of most optimal stopping problems is the Markovian nature of the decision to stop
based upon the value of the current state. The system has either a reward or cost
for each additional period, and once the decision has been made to continue with
the system, the reward for the next period is received, and the system transitions
according to a probability distribution to the next state. At this next state, the
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decision must be revisited.
This optimal stopping problem will be modeled as an MDP with finite state
space and fixed time horizon. The fixed time horizon is a reasonable modeling as-
sumption, with current limits on service career lengths. The model will be analyzed
for optimal stopping policies for each of the grades, looking at sensitivities to civilian
pay expectation as well as sensitivities to personal discount rate. The MDP used
to model retirement behavior can be effectively solved by dynamical programming
techniques. Many references exist explaining modeling and solutions techniques for
this class of problem (Bertsekas 1995, Miranda and Fackler 2002, Adda and Cooper
2003, Puterman 2005).
A policy is a decision rule that prescribes the action that a decision maker
should make upon reaching any particular state in a certain period. The policy may
be a deterministic or a randomized policy and may be time dependent or stationary.
An optimal policy is a policy that results in the maximum (minimum) value of the
stated objective function. The theory for solution of discrete state MDP is based
upon the principle of optimality due to Bellman (Bertsekas 1995).
Given the MDP state space X and the action space A, define the state xt ∈ X,
and action at ∈ At(x), t = 1, 2, . . . T , with β as the personal discount factor, Π the
space of all policies, A(x) ⊂ A, denoting the feasible action set for a given state
x, and R(x, a) the reward function for a given state x and action a. Solving this
optimal stopping program amounts to finding a policy π = {πt, t = 1, 2, . . .} ∈ Π,
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where πt : X → A, that maximizes the expected total discounted reward




βk−1R(xk, πk(xk))|x1 = x
]
.
We define the corresponding reward-to-go for a policy π at time t as




βk−tR(xk, πk(xk))|xt = x
]
.
The optimality equations for the optimal stopping problem are




V ∗t (x) = max
π∈Π
V πt (x) (2.2)
where V ∗ is the optimal value function. The solution to (2.1) or (2.2) is normally
referred to as stochastic dynamic programming. Dynamic programming is equivalent
to the solution method of backward induction and is founded in the principle of
optimality, which provides this traditional solution method for a discrete MDP with
a finite horizon. The solution of the MDP will consist of an optimal value function
V ∗ and the associated optimal policy, π∗, that provides the prescription for the
decision to be made in each state.
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2.2.3 Retirement Model
Building upon this mathematical structure, we next describe the MDP used
to model Army officer retirement decisions. We explain the states of the MDP,
the rewards or cash flows at each state of the Markov chain, and the optimality
conditions or value function used to model this decision process.
2.2.3.1 States
The model will address officers in the ranks of 2LT though COL. Each state in
the model will represent a combination of grade, years-of-service and time-in-grade.
Each of the ranks is modeled by several states to address differences in compensation,
as well as promotion opportunity. The rank state space in this model has 29 different
rank and years in grade combinations, each indexed by years of service. The model
in Gotz and McCall (1983) modeled the ranks of CPT though COL with 13 states
to address promotion timing, and a single state to address involuntary separations.
The state space was enlarged to model Air Force regular and reserve commissions,
resulting in 27 total states. However, when the High Three retirement structure
in the new objective function is combined with the states described in Gotz and
McCall (1983), the model is no longer Markovian, motivating the creation of a new
model.
Currently, all Army officers receive the same commission, and there are three
opportunities for early promotions, and as such states for COL will have 18-40 years
of service and 0-3 years in grade. Although a COL at 30 years who was promoted
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at year 22 will have 8 years in grade, there is no compensation difference after three
years in grade for retirement, and so the additional states do not add fidelity to the
model unless Brigadier General promotions are modeled. LTCs will possibly have
14-40 years of service and 0-6 years in grade. MAJs will have 9-40 years in service
and 0-6 years in grade. CPTs can have 3-40 years of service, and 0-8 years in grade.
1LTs will have 1-40 years in service and 0-3 years in grade. 2LTs will have 0-40
years in service and 0-3 years in grade.
Table 2.1 displays the states in the network model. These states are numbered
in sequence from 1 to 29, with the traditional career path shown in the fourth
column. Most Army officers are promoted in accordance with this career timeline,
although there are three opportunities for early promotions, to MAJ, LTC and COL.
With the three opportunities for early promotions, there are eight career paths to
COL that reflect the combinations of early and due-course promotions. Due-course
is the term used by the Army for the standard career model. This timeline is
reflected the fourth column of Table 2.1.
The years-of-service are captured as the time variable in the model. The years-
in-grade are critical to identify the promotion probabilities, as well as calculating the
rank held for the final three years of service. The 29 distinct pay/rank combination
states, each indexed by years of service results in 1160 states.
Figure 2.1 represents the transition diagram for the Markov chain modeling
an officer’s career. The transition probabilities are slightly stylized, but reflect insti-
tutional beliefs within the Army (Haight and Lewis 2008). Currently promotions to
1LT are approved locally, resulting in the near 100% selection rates. However, those
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Table 2.1: Rank States in MC
that the Commander deems not ready for promotion, are given a 50% probability
of qualifying each year. The promotions rates to CPT, MAJ, and LTC are adjusted
to 99% to reflect the current perception that all officers are being promoted. The
promotion to COL is modeled at 50%, the current legal floor under DOPMA (Ros-






























































































Figure 2.1: Markov Chain for Rank State Space
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each year group. As the Army is currently short MAJ and LTC, and over-strength
COL, we modeled the first two early promotions, from state 11 to 14 and 18 to
21, at 10% and modeled the early promotion from 24 to 27 at 5%. Sensitivity to
transition probabilities was explored in numerical experiments.
2.2.3.2 Transitions
Each year is modeled as a period, and the officer progresses though the Markov
chain described in Figure 2.1. The officer knows his/her current state, which includes
information on rank, years at current rank, as well as years-in-service. Let Px,y,t
denote the probability of transitioning from the current state x in period t to state
y in the next period, t + 1. The transition matrix P ≡ [Px,y,t] reflects the Markov
chain described by Figure 2.1 with promotion opportunities greater than the floors
established by Congress.
The transition matrix does not allow for demotions, and as such has all zero el-
ements below the diagonal. States are naturally grouped by rank with the transition
matrix describing increasing seniority within the current rank, as well as promotions
to the next rank. The extra states within each rank are necessary to capture the
information necessary for retirement and promotion calculations. Pay is not depen-
dent on the path taken to any state, only on the current rank and time in service,
information which is contained in each rank state and the model’s time variable.
The “High Three” retirement system is also path independent, because pay
is not dependent on years in each state, but only on the rank held and years in
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service. Since the first state of each rank can only be accessed from the immediately
junior rank and the time spent at each rank ≥ 2, each state contains the necessary
information to accurately calculate retirement pay. Therefore, the first state of each
rank is immediately preceded by at least two states of the previous rank, which
can be used for calculation of retirement pay, independent of the path the officer
actually took though the Markov chain. Under a no demotions assumptions, the






An officer will make a decision each period to continue on active duty and
receive their next period pay and benefits or to leave active service. The value of
staying in the military for an additional period for an officer in state x is recursively
defined by




where mx,t is base military compensation in state x in period t, and cx,t is additional
compensation, housing and subsistence, only received while on active duty, also in
state x at period t. Discounting the next period value function at the personal
discount rate β, and summing over all possible transitions from the current state x
to possible future states y captures the period t expected value of compensation of
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staying in the military for an additional period.
Although single period compensation is strictly increasing with time in service
and grade, the expected total earnings in any given state incorporates future pro-
motions and uncertainty that is resolved over time and as a result is only monotonic
for COL.
The value of leaving military service is a combination of the pay that will be
received from working in the civilian sector and the value of any military retirement
that has been earned up to the epoch that the soldier leaves active duty. The
percentage of m̂ that will be received in retirement compensation from the military
is represented by
rt = 1{t ≥ 20}(.5 + 0.025(t− 20))
where 1{.} is the set indicator function. This equates to a retirement consisting of
50% of base pay at 20 years, increasing an additional 2.5% for each additional year







βk−tmx,t(1 + ξk−t) (2.3)
where ξn represents a civilian raise in year n of working in the civilian sector and mx,t
represents the starting civilian pay in retirement, assumed to be equal to final pay
in the Army. The expected number of years that the officer will receive retirement
benefits is represented by τ − η in (2.3), where life expectancy is represented by
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τ and the age at commissioning is represented by η. Past mandatory retirement
at 40 years, months of civilian earnings available will be assumed to be equivalent
across all states, but the distribution of income based on years in the civilian sector
may very significantly. Time T represents full military retirement at forty years of
service, i.e. rt = 1.0, and T − t captures the number of periods that the officer has
remaining to work in the civilian sector.
The starting assumption for level of civilian compensation is that the officer
is being fairly compensated by the Army. As such, the officer is expected to be
able to command a similar salary in the civilian sector. Civilian pay is modeled as
a monotonically increasing function, beginning at the pay level of the officer when
they exit military service. The sensitivity to this initial level of compensation will
be explored in numerical experiments.
2.2.3.4 Value Function
Each officer will make a decision each period to continue to serve or retire and
seek civilian employment. The assumption is made that the officer will continue to
pursue full-time employment for a 40 year work career. The optimal stopping policy
will be found by evaluating the value of all possible decisions at each state and period
and choosing optimally at each state. In order to exploit the principle of optimality
from dynamic programming, the value of each state at final time, T = 40, must be
calculated. This time reflects mandatory retirement, and assuming τ > η + T , no
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decision can be made but to accept the cash flow associated with the final state







Creating the T − 1 value function is a choice of serving one additional period,














Solving for the value of each period by backwards induction, the value function for
each period is represented as
Vt(x) = max
{














We solved the retirement model using a dynamic programming formulation,
allowing for some sensitivity analyses, in addition to obtaining the expected value
of continuing or retiring in each state at each time period. The value function is the
optimal solution for a given state in a given time period. This is computed using a
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backward induction algorithm, so it is dependent on making optimal decisions up
to that point. The civilian opportunity at 20 years incorporates vesting in military
retirement and is the first epoch where the civilian opportunities are greater than
military compensation, providing an optimal point to retire for many states.
Represent the action of continuing to serve in the Army by s and the decision
to resign or retire as q, so that a ∈ {s, q}, and define










βk−tmx,t(1 + ξk−t), (2.5)
then
V ∗t (x) = max
a∈{s,q}
Q∗t (x, a).
The addition of a taste parameter α to allow for differing valuations of civilian wages
to (2.5) results in the following modification for the optimal reward-to-go function
defined by (2.2):







A taste-neutral officer will have a taste parameter α = 1 and will value compen-
sation gained from the military or civilian sector equivalently. When α > 1, the
officer would prefer to be working in the civilian sector, and correspondingly α < 1
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represents a preference for the military lifestyle. The assumed personal discount rate
is 13.6%, i.e. β = 0.88, with starting civilian pay equal to last military pay. In our
numerical experiments, we assume the officer is married and value basic allowance
for housing at the “with dependents” rate.
The taste parameter α allows us to explore non-cash compensation and in-
tangible benefits. An officer may have aversion to change, believing that switching
careers would entail significant effort. In addition, each officer has some value they
place on their total compensation, including tax advantages and prestige benefits.
In this way, decreasing the value of α describes an individual that would require an
incrementally higher civilian wage in retirement to feel equivalently compensated
for the effort of changing careers and the value of non-monetary compensation and
prestige.
Figure 2.2 provides a graphical representation of the optimal decision as a
function of rank/years in grade and number of years in service, where the retirement
boundary is given by Q∗t (x, q) = Q
∗
t (x, s). As seen in Figure 2.2, most states first
cross the retirement boundary at 20 years. In addition, the states in the upper left
corner of the graph are practically unattainable since any officer with four years or
less of service would still be obligated to the Army under an initial service obligation.
Without discounting, the continuous approximation of Q∗t (x, q) is strictly de-
creasing in time and increasing in state. However, the Markov chain includes semi-
absorbing states, ones for which the probability of leaving is very low, which keeps
Q∗t (x, s) from being increasing in state. Neglecting these states, Q
∗
t (x, s) is also in-












































Figure 2.2: Retirement Boundary Q∗t (x, q) = Q
∗
t (x, s)
are both concave functions with a single optimal for each state over time. In this
model, most of the states are transient, and therefore the change over time and state
in combination is most critical to the behavior described here. As shown in (2.4),
the value of continuing in the Army, Q∗t (x, s), incorporates the future value func-
tion, and incorporates optimal choice in each future state. The comparison is made
to civilian opportunity, Q∗t (x, q), which in this model does not depend on future
decisions.
An interesting point illustrated by Figure 2.2 is that the LTC states, exclud-
ing 25, display an optimal decision to retire at 20 years. State 25 reflects a 50%
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promotion opportunity to COL, and with the increase in military pay and civilian
opportunity, the optimal decision is to stay for an additional year. Interestingly, the
difference in pay with discounting at 12% only has a one period effect, as an officer
would optimally retire in state 24, 26, and 27. Although state 27 is not reachable
until 22 years for a due-course officer, it is interesting to note that each COL state
is a retirement state.
Another point to notice from Figure 2.2 is that the optimal decision for year
19 is to stay for all states, indicating that the optimal decision for all the 19th year
states is to serve for one additional year. This relationship holds for all attainable
rank states with t < 20. We conducted extensive sensitivity analysis, and found
that sensitivity to personal discount rate and to civilian pay opportunity (or taste
for military lifestyle) were the most interesting and will be detailed in the following
sections.
2.3.1 Discount Rate
In the numerical experiments, initially the personal discount rate was set at
13.6%, but as research has shown military officers’ discount rates could be as high at
20% Warner and Pleeter (2001). The sensitivity to personal discount rate for LTC at
20 years is depicted in Figure 2.3. The cost to leave is defined as Q∗t (x, s)−Q∗t (x, q),
so that a positive cost to leave is associate with the optimal policy to stay in the
Army. As shown in the graph, the retirement boundary for LTC at twenty years
is between an 11% and 12% personal discount rate. Officers having lower discount
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rates should optimally choose to continue serving at 20 years, whereas those with
higher discount rates would choose to retire. As expected, state 25 has the highest
personal discount rate crossover point, and state 26, the semi-absorbing state, has
the lowest. A risk-neutral individual would have a personal discount rate that is
close to the rate of borrowing. As detailed in Warner and Pleeter (2001), different
individuals may face different borrowing rates affecting their value of inter-temporal
substitution and that personal discount rates decreases with increasing education
and income. Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimated personal discount rates for officers
between 10 and 20 years of service between 10% and 19%.









































Figure 2.3: Personal Discount Rate Sensitivity
To gain some intuition for the difference in personal discount rate, we provide
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the following bounds on the value of retiring at any state. The personal discount rate
adjusts the value of retirement, as does the number of years that the officer expects
to spend in retirement. As the number of years in retirement is always finite, the
value of retirement is also always finite. With discounting, even letting the number
of years that the officer will spend in retirement tend to ∞, the value of retirement
stream still has an upper bound which can easily be found by taking the limit of the
geometric series. Taking the limit of the retirement portion of the Q∗t (x, q) function
at three different personal discount provides some intuition concerning the difference
in value of retirement. For personal discount rates of 5%, 10% and 20% the upper
limits are 20rtm̂x,t, 10rtm̂x,t, and 5rtm̂x,t.
This shows that officers that choose to continue serving may, in addition to
possibly having a higher taste for military service, also have a lower personal dis-
count rate. It might be that the security of the military compensation and retirement
system, combined with lack of compensation volatility entices those with lower per-
sonal discount rate to serve longer careers. This might suggest that officers serving
past 20 years are serving for a combination of taste and monetary compensation
that is tied to their low discounting of their military retirement.
Figure 2.3 also shows that the personal discount rate for COL that would
result in an optimal choice of staying in the Army is between 8% and 9%. This
would require a personal discount rate equivalent to the interest rate and much
lower than estimated in the literature. Holding the personal discount rate at 12%
would require discounting the civilian opportunity by 22-23%, as shown in Figure
2.5 and discussed in the next section.
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Figure 2.4: Transition Rate Sensitivity
Figure 2.4 displays the changing break-even personal discount rate as the pro-
motion opportunity to COL varies from 50% to 100%. Although each of the promo-
tions modeled by the transition probabilities effects the future value of continuing,
only the promotion to COL is relevant to the exploration of LTC retirement deci-
sions. As Figure 2.2 indicates optimal policy for t < 20 is to stay in the Army, the
promotion rate to COL is the critical parameter. Interpret the changing probabili-
ties of promotion to COL in Figure 2.4 as conditional probabilities based on some
additional information revealed to the officer prior to t = 20. Assuming again a
personal discount rate of 12%, all LTC that viewed their conditional probability of
promotion to COL as greater that 60% would follow an optimal policy of staying
43
in the Army at 20 years. This could be interpreted as attaining some other selec-
tion prior to t = 20, e.g. War College, Battalion Command, PhD Schooling, and
adjusting the conditional probability of selection to COL appropriately.
2.3.2 Changing Civilian Opportunities
The assumption that a retiring officer can command the same salary in their
second career as on active duty is a strong simplifying assumption. However, if the
labor market is efficient, and officers possess transferable skills, the assumption that
civilian salary would be approximately the same as the salary they are earning in
the Army is reasonable (Stigler 1962). We assume that the mean of the distribution
of potential salaries is their current salary. Also from the perspective of the officer,
his/her current salary provides a benchmark to compare against potential future
offers.
Some officers have the intention to “do something different” in retirement.
These are taste differences, and the desire to start a new career may easily drive
the retirement decision. Clearly doing something different might have very dif-
ferent compensation, but there are may field grade specialties that translate very
closely to civilian occupations. Nuclear engineers, physicists, software engineers,
operations research analysts and public affairs officers all closely align with post-
military employment. As such, it would be a reasonable assumption that under
an efficient labor market assumption, civilian compensation should mirror military
compensation. However, it might be such that in expectation the compensation is
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Changing Taste for Military Life
 
 
LTC (24) at 20 years
LTC (25) at 21 years
LTC (26) at 22 years
COL (27) at 22 years
Figure 2.5: Changing Civilian Opportunities, personal discount rate = 12%
very comparable, but very different in distribution, especially considering the low
variance and skew in the military pay system.
In this model, the expected civilian compensation is not dependent on future
value functions, as seen in (2.5) and Figure 2.5. Varying α as a taste parameter
changes the value of civilian compensation linearly. This can alternatively be inter-
preted as an increase (decrease) in taste for military lifestyle or decrease (increase)
in available civilian compensation. In this model, increasing α represents an increase
in available civilian compensation or decrease in taste for military lifestyle. Holding
the personal discount factor at 12%, with α > 0.92, the optimal decision for LTC is
to retire at 20 years and for values of α < 0.92 the decision is reversed. Figure 2.5
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also shows that for COL at 22 years, the decision is to retire when α > 0.78 and to
continue serving when α < 0.78. This result suggests that the current compensation
package incentivizes officers that discount civilian opportunities by 25% to continue
serving until their consideration for COL, and possibly even until mandatory retire-
ment.
This model finds that the taste-neutral officer decision is very dependent on
their personal discount rate, but the linearity of the taste parameters makes the
model more dependent on the assumption of pay distribution rather than the α
value. However, changing α values can be interpreted in a couple of different ways.
Clearly, if civilian opportunity is less than the salary you are earning on active duty,
it is optimal to continue serving. Also, the α can be viewed as a taste for military
service. There are many unique features of serving, and this value can be viewed as a
relative weighting of military compensation versus civilian opportunities. Similarly,
an officer that had a large aversion to mid-career change, or placed a high value
on the prestige of serving in the Army, would have a lower α and require a higher
offered civilian wage to change their optimal policy from that of continuing to serve.
2.4 Summary and Policy Analysis
In Gotz and McCall (1983), an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel would optimally
wait to see if they were promoted to Colonel, and then conditioned on not being se-
lected, they would retire at 23 years. Here we found that a LTC not being considered
for promotion would retire at 20 years. A significant issue is that the COL promo-
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tion opportunity for due course officers is at 22 years of service, and the current
compensation system does not provide incentive for officers to serve the additional
year after twenty to compete for this last promotion. Our results indicates that non-
monetary factors play a significant role in the decision to compete for promotion to
COL, and that COL compensation alone does not provide incentive for continued
service.
Clearly the change to allow a 40 year career is only a meaningful innovation
is if there is an incentive to serve that long in uniform. Of course, the existence of
officers serving past the perceived fiscally optimal retirement point lends credence
to any model that includes or weights non-pecuniary factors. Even without knowing
exactly which non-pecuniary factors are the the most significant, modeling can price
these factors by comparing model predication with empirical behavior of the force.
If the 1981 policy changes had the desired effects, optimal points would be
greater under the new system. However, the policy change appears to have the
opposite effect in the model. This shift agrees with anecdotal evidence from Army
officers that carreer aspirations have shifted to retirement at LTC at 20 years. How-
ever, it is problematic if the selection point to COL is at 22 years, past the optimal
retirement point for a LTC. Such a shift creates a system where the Army only
incentivizes careers past twenty years for officers with aspirations to General offi-
cer rank and who strongly value the non-pecuniary benefits of military service and
discount the advantages of civilian life.
Our model also demonstrates the value and importance of promotion signals
regarding the promotion distribution to COL. Assuming that the Army has knowl-
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edge of the subset of officers most competitive for promotion, signaling to these
officers can alter their optimal retirement policy. As shown in Figure 2.4, signaling
an increased promotion opportunity from 50% to 75% for some officers would switch
these officer’s optimal policy at twenty years to continuing to serve in the Army and
competing for promotion to COL.
2.5 Future Research
Several additional areas of exploration could expand the results of this chap-
ter. An empirical analysis of the actual salaries of retired officers would increase the
strength of the results. The civilian pay assumption that an officer retiring can con-
tinue to earn the same salary in retirement is reasonable if there are no significant
pay disparities between civilian and military occupations. Empirical work to esti-
mate the earnings paths of retired officers in different specialties would add richness
to our results.
Also, empirical study of the current behavior of retiring officers will indicate
any shifts in behavior. Although there are many factors influencing early retirement,
the behavior of current LTCs is key to understanding the expected population of
officers serving until they are considered for promotion to COL. In addition, the
modeling of General officer opportunity might provide some insight into the retention
behavior of those officers whose early promotions provide them a higher opportunity
of promotion beyond COL.
Officers are not homogeneous, and adding differences between officer types
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could add richness to the model. The α coefficient examines the differences in how
an officer values their current compensation, but the model could be expanded to
model two different types of primary motivations: prestige and economic. In this
type of a model, learning could occur as the individual updates transition/promotion
probabilities over time and shifts primary motivation between that of prestige and
economic motivations. This would allow signals, e.g. performance reports, school
or command selections, to be incorporated into the individual’s decision-making.
Different utility functions, e.g. power or exponential, could also be used to examine
possible different valuations between individuals.
The tax advantage of staying in the military and the security of the military
career are two additional areas to explore. Many senior officers serve in the Pentagon,
which provides tax-free housing compensation at a higher level than most Army
posts. Also, while serving on active duty, officers do not have to pay state taxes
based on their posting, but rather based upon their residence. This allows many to
serve in the Virginia area and enjoy the additional benefits of the National Capital
Region, without having to pay the taxes that would be required if working in the
civilian sector. These additional modifiers to salary could also strengthen the results.
Although this discrete state space, fixed horizon problem is easily solved using
dynamic programming, other solution methodologies might offer additional insight
for sensitivity analysis. It has been established that MDPs can be alternatively
modeled as linear programs and the resulting solution might offer additional oppor-
tunities for sensitivity analysis and for exploiting the dual formulation. Simulation
methodologies might add additional insight in creating sample career paths, and to
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facilitate additional exploration of civilian pay distributions.
In this chapter we have found that the optimal policy for taste-neutral LTCs
is to retire at 20 years. This suggests that research in areas of organizational theory
to investigate what compensation a mid-career worker most highly values might
provide additional insight into why and which LTCs stay. Such investigation could
suggest policy and programatic changes that the Army could implement if there was
a need to increase mid-career officer continuation rates.
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Chapter 3
Army Officer Force Profiles and Markovian Manpower Models
3.1 Introduction
Illinois Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen is credited with commenting, “a
billion here, and a billion there, and pretty soon you are talking about real money”
(Senate 2009). The cost of officer manpower in 2008 was $9.04 billion, accounting
for 36% of the total $47 billion manpower bill and 5% of the total Army funding of
$155 billion for fiscal year 2008 (OSD 2008).
The cost of the Army manpower program is the largest line in the President’s
budget, and a substantial part of that budget is devoted to the executives, managers
and leaders of this force, the officer corps. The officer corps is currently roughly
75,000 soldiers in 10 ranks, and over 50 specialties. This manpower system is made
increasingly complex by a restriction requiring most accessions at Second Lieutenant
(2LT), the entry level commissioned officer rank. This restriction, termed a bar to
lateral entry, is common to all the services and serves as a defining characteristic of
military manpower systems.
It is relatively straightforward to document the specialty and ranks required
within an organization. However, documenting time in grade or time in service re-
quirements is more complex. In academia, a classroom can be filled by any professor
in a specialty, with substitutability for rank and time at the university. In Army
51
units, officer positions are coded for a particular branch and rank. The documented
requirements do not detail a desired age distribution of the position and hence do
not provide requirements for the age distribution of the workforce. This subtle nu-
ance displays the difference in planning the work assignments for a given year versus
planning for the career workforce of the entire organization.
Any organization would prefer some mix of junior and senior members of each
rank and specialty. The employees need to have a structure in the organization that
offers them a viable career. However, how the Army as a whole should aggregate
such requirements and provide viable career paths for the soldiers and officers is a
non-trivial manpower problem.
The manpower requirements for the Army are expressed in terms of a force
profile. The focus on providing viable officer careers has traditionally focused on
modeling year groups, i.e. time in service, in order to express the differentiation
between alternate force profiles. Although the description of a force profile focuses
on details of time in service or experience, the Army requirement documents are
only detailed to rank and specialty. Here we look to combine modeling efforts based
on time in service, with the requirements detailed at rank and specialty.
Here we look to find an optimal commissioned officer force profile. The
officer corps are the most senior leaders of the uniformed Army. Clearly, an opti-
mization of the force profile could take several forms. Best force for a given cost or
cheapest cost for a required force would be two obvious alternative objective func-
tions. Another alternative is to suggest that the current force is optimal, as it is
clearly feasible, and then attempt to find a way to maintain the system at steady
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state in the neighborhood of the current state.
We will develop a model of the force profile and its evolution over time, con-
trolled by the manpower planners of the Army Staff, but subject to the decisions of
individual officer’s, Congressional guidance and Department of Defense leadership.
In times of change, where either the operational requirements or budget constraints
might change drastically, a model can provide a prescription of how to get to the
new required force, from the current force.
There are several methods of analysis that have an established history in
manpower planning, and we will look to combine insights from several modeling
paradigms and develop a linear programming model of the Army officer corps. We
propose a new network structure that incorporates both rank and years in grade
to combine cohort, rank, and specialty modeling without falling into the common
pitfalls of small cell size and uncontrollable end effects.
This model follows in the tradition established by Gass et al. (1988) and im-
plements modeling techniques and insights from the Army implementation of the
Enlisted Grade and Enlisted Specialty model (Hall 2004, Cashbaugh et al. 2007).
This chapter is the first implementation of specialty modeling in a manpower model
for U.S. Army officers. Models of the U.S. Army manpower system have isolated
accession planning for second lieutenants (Henry and Ravindran 2005) and the Ca-
reer Field Designation process for majors (Shrimpton and Newman 2005), but this
is the first integration of rank and specialty modeling over the entire career and
development of an optimal force profile.
This chapter will highlight aspects of manpower modeling in operations re-
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search, and Section 3.2 discusses the literature that has contributed to the devel-
opment of the different modeling approaches in this research area. Section 3.3 will
explore characteristics of U.S. Army officer manpower planning before presenting a
linear programming model to find the optimal force profile in Section 3.4. We con-
clude with results from our experiments in Section 3.5 and possibilities for extensions
in Section 3.6.
3.2 Manpower Modeling
Manpower models need to answer questions for the planner. The structure
of the force may be already set or may be the product of exploration. Models are
often used for forecasting and cost estimation, as well as to investigate the feasi-
bility of proposed structures. Manpower models are designed to help with some
aspect of creating and sustaining a force of workers to accomplish the organization’s
objectives or mission. Much of the literature focuses in those industries and appli-
cation areas where there is a human delivered element of the product or service,
e.g. education, consulting and defense. The area of manpower planning has been an
interdisciplinary area of research that is not unique to the military, but is a function
of all large organizations.
Statistical models in manpower research fill a role that can be identified as
belonging to one or more of four categories: descriptive, forecasting, control or
design. Clearly there is some overlap, but this is the categorization framework
presented in Bartholomew et al. (1991). Any given model can have strengths in one
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or more of these categories.
Descriptive models look at the distributions of the systems, with the intent
of developing metrics to indicate the current state of the system. The number of
personnel in different ranks, and the experience distribution of the workforce are
common descriptive statistics used in manpower planning. Insight into the number
of assignments that are available at different grades or the number of new hires
needed at the different levels of the organization can be determined from a model
that accurately describes the current state of the system.
Forecasting models focus on the changes that will take place in the system if
current trends continue. A forecasting model that describes a system in steady state
is not making a prediction about what trends will come to be, but instead provides
prediction for the state of the system under that assumption that current trends
continue. The forecast can help to guide decisions to be made, but traditionally
forecasting models do not offer recourse within the model.
Control models reflect changes to the system based upon managerial action.
The management is viewed as having some set of tools or levers, such as promo-
tions or new hires, and the models are designed to illustrate potential impacts of
different decisions. Often control and forecasting models are combined to allow
the exploration of the effect of different policies given the assumption that trends
continue.
Design models help the decision maker create new systems, and look to see
what characteristics will be present in that system. Design models will borrow
heavily from, or intersect with, concepts from, and used in, organizational design.
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In manpower intensive and service industries, the workforce is the key product of
operations, and design models can be crucial in the management of these operations.
In the military, education and consulting, the workforce is the key element of the
operation.
Two of the main questions addressed by these classes of models are attainabil-
ity and sustainability. In a multi-class or rank system, e.g, military and academia,
the number and experience in each grade can be of fundamental interest. In the
military, this can be expressed as a force profile. The officer force profile is an
expression of the number of officers by grade and time in service. One assumption
is that productivity will increase with experience, suggesting that the organization
would like to retain experience at all levels. Yet, serving for too long at any one
stage in the organization can cause stagnation and motivational challenges. More-
over, the force profile must meet the services needs. The traditional graded military
manpower system with a bar to lateral entry may place limits on the number of
time periods required to move to a desired force profile.
Another important modeling characteristic is the closed or open nature of the
system. Many social processes are modeled using a closed system, and the flow into
or out of the system are the key metrics. Other models focus on an open system,
and focus on the attrition or wastage, as personnel are lost from the system and
workers must be promoted to fill vacancies or new workers must be hired to maintain
the system. Models can focus either on modeling workers, jobs or a combination
of the two. When modeling jobs, a model will often look to assign workers against
vacancies. When focusing on modeling workers, there traditionally must be a time
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component which could be discrete or continuous.
3.2.1 A Textbook Introduction
The foundations of manpower modeling within operations research and man-
agement science are clearly laid out in a series of textbooks. Grinold and Marshall
(1977) covers an introduction to manpower models and Vajda (1978) addresses the
mathematics of deterministic manpower models. Bartholomew (1982) addresses
sochastic social process, of which manpower modeling is a featured example, and
Bartholomew et al. (1991) further extends statistical methods for manpower models.
Manpower planning covers a wide range of problems and applications, in ad-
dition to the military manpower planning problems that are our focus. Tien and
Kamiyama (1982) provides a survey of algorithms for scheduling manpower, incor-
porating total requirements as well as vacation in creating shift and work schedules.
Edwards (1983) provides a summary that focuses on how current models have been
implemented, and issues that arise from trying to implement manpower planning
models. They focus on civilian manpower planning in the United Kingdom, with a
secondary application to other European countries. Green et al. (2001) provide an
application of queueing theory to staffing issues in hospital emergency departments.
Gass (1991) provides a primer of military manpower modeling and breaks the
research into three main groups: network models, transition rate models, and goal
programming models. Common to all three groups is a modeling construct that
describes individuals who are aggregated by a set of attributes and grouped into
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classes. Each combination of a set of attributes at each time period represents a
state. Each state will contain a number of individuals with common attributes.
Army manpower planners refer to the level of aggregation used in the model of a
system as subsystem aggregates (SSAs). We will next explore some of the manpower
research that has been completed in each of the different mathematical modeling
classes.
3.2.2 Network Models
Network models are based upon an extension of the transportation problem
to personnel assignments. Network models ensure conservation of flow and have the
advantage of producing integer solutions. The models are especially powerful when
modeling systems with a limited number of characteristics at each time period. The
following are military examples of the personnel assignment problem that have been
modeled using variations of network flow models.
Klingman and Phillips (1984) addresses both topological and computational
aspects of assigning enlisted Marine Corps personnel to positions. Their model is
a network flow model to assign 10,000 Marines to billets, which groups billets into
differing priority levels, and assigns fill percentages to each subset. Bausch et al.
(1991) looks at wartime assignment of Marine Officers. Their model increases the
pool of officers available to assign to wartime tasks by considering all active duty and
reserve Marine officers to be available for reassignment to fill a wartime billet plan,
even though loosening to this extent the constraint of the number of officers who are
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available for reassignment at any one period may not be feasible or reflect the needs
of the Marine Corps. Krass et al. (1994) developed a model for Navy personnel
assignment to ships and combat units. Their model incorporates Navy readiness
metrics and seeks to optimize personnel readiness in the individual ships and across
the Navy. Reeves and Reid (1999) also examines the readiness of a combat unit, in
their case a reserve company. They focus on the schooling and training required for
the company’s soldiers, and maximize the percentage of soldiers with the required
skills.
Holder (2005) looks at the problem of offering assignments to sailors while
maintaining readiness for the Navy. In their model, a subset of the jobs for which
a sailor is qualified are selected and offered to the sailor, when a sailor calls their
assignment manager or detailer. The non-selected jobs are returned to the available
list after the sailor makes a selection or after predetermined waiting period. Lewis
et al. (2006) also looks at the Navy assignment problem, grouping sailors into teams
that will be assigned to a command using interval bounds, and incorporating train-
ing and minimum class sizes for training that will be required enroute to the new
assignment. Shrimpton and Newman (2005) uses a network model to describe the
assignment of Army officers to functional areas. Additional specialties exist at the
field grade ranks that are not prevalent at the company grade ranks, and this model
decides how to allocate the existing inventory to the larger group of specialties. The




Transition rate models require transition probabilities as an underlying as-
sumption. Given an initial distribution, Markov models will answer the question of
what attributes the force will have at each phase in the planning period. When mod-
eling with a transition rate model, each individual follows the same Markov process
and individuals are assumed to behave independently. Whereas the network models
described earlier focused on military personnel assignments, the following research
focused on describing manpower in academia.
Examples of Markov manpower models in discrete time are described and
solved in Feichtinger and Mehlmann (1976) and Feichtinger (1976), where the au-
thors examine stable populations and age distributions in open systems. They link
the Gani-type education manpower models with Leslie linear population dynamics
models. Mehlmann (1977) extends their results to continuous Markovian manpower
models. Davies (1976, 1982) considers the effect of recruitment policies and es-
pecially the importance of smoothing hiring actions. In this model, recruitment
policies are derived using fixed promotions which are controlled by management,
and the stochasticity in the model involves employee continuation decisions. In this
model, employees in each stage are modeled as independent binomial random vari-
ables, and this independence assumption facilitates calculation of one and two-step
probabilities and recruitment policies.
Grinold and Stanford (1974) creates a mathematical programming model to
investigate fractional flow models. They examine both finite and infinite horizon,
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fixed and free final state constraints, steady-state distributions with staff distribution
constraints, and temporarily transient systems moving towards steady-state. Their
models are created to design possible structures, rather than to prescribe operational
promotion policies. Grinold (1976) presents a manpower model for Naval aviators
that is a hybrid between a linear-quadratic optimal control problem and Markov
decision problem. The demand for Naval aviators is varied based upon six states of
the world that correspond to various peace and wartime states. Dynamic programing
solutions are presented to find steady-state solutions for the objectives of minimizing
the weighted squared error between supply and demand and smoothing the flow of
manpower.
Feuer and Schinnar (1984) link personnel and vacancy flows in a graded per-
sonnel system, focusing on promotion opportunities and outside hiring within a large
university community. Their results examined the effect on junior faculty promo-
tions when additional senior faculty are hired. Stanford (1980, 1985) develops a
mobility process based upon the cumulative length of service of members of a given
rank. The loss distribution and promotion distributions are taken as inputs and
their model develops time in service estimates for each rank. Different promotion
policies with regard to seniority are evaluated and used to derive expected length of
service distributions.
Yadavalli and Natarajan (2001) examines a single grade system to study
the cost to the organization of having vacancies and recruiting. Nilakantan and
Raghavendra (2005, 2008) look at proportionality policies, bounding the recruitment
to each grade to a proportion of the population. They address the controllability
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of such a system in term of attainability of a given structure and maintainability of
such structure, focusing on the numbers of internal promotions and external hires.
3.2.4 Goal Programming
Price and Piskor (1972) first applied goal programming to military manpower
planning, interpreting the constraints as goals as opposed to hard constraints. They
created a control model for a three-year planning horizon to forecast strengths by
specialty and provide promotions prescriptions for the Canadian Army officer corps.
Zanakis and Maret (1980, 1981) describes a Markov chain model for forecasting
available inventory, and then a one-period preemptive linear goal program to allocate
workload in an engineering firm.
Holz and Wroth (1980) describes the development of ELIM-COMPLIP, En-
listed Loss Inventory Module Computation of Manpower Programs Using Linear
Programming. The linear programming solution of the manpower program was the
initial solution used to complete the transition from a conscript manpower system
to the All-Voluneteer Force (AVF). The initial COMPLIP model was created to
provide an alternative to the computerization of the manual system, and the incre-
mental improvement that resulted in the ELIM-COMPLIP model were operationally
employed by Army manpower planners until replaced by the Enlisted Grade (EG)
model early in the 21st century (Hall 2004).
Collins et al. (1983) designs a goal programming formulation to balance the
education level, mental category, i.e. CAT I -IV, race and sex of recruiting goals
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in order to meet manpower requirements. The model develops historical rates and
factors, simulates losses over a one-year horizon, optimizes the quality mix for acces-
sions to meet manpower requirements, and then calculates the cost of the resulting
manpower. Gass et al. (1988) describes a goal programming model that prescribes
accessions, promotions, separations to minimize the different from grade goals and
total force goals. The model makes use of a Markov model to estimate projected
manpower, and then optimizes to match requirements over a ten and twenty year
planning horizon.
Bres et al. (1980) allocates Naval officer accession from each of the commission-
ing sources to different warfare communities. The objective function is to minimize
deviation from strength goals, subject to policy constraints, including bounds to
minimize inter-year deviations. Henry and Ravindran (2005) compares preemptive
and non-preemptive models to assign Army officers to initial branches and branch
detail programs.
3.2.5 Stochastic Programming
Martel and Al-Nuaimi (1973) models a oil industry manpower problem as a
two-stage stochastic program with recourse. The application is made to industries
where skilled labor and union rules make hiring and firing expensive and where it
is not possible to create extra inventory when the manpower is not required. The
recourse decision in this model is only to hire additional manpower, temporary work-
ers or pay overtime when it is determined that the base staffing level is inadequate.
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Martel and Price (1981) combines the results of goal programming and stochastic
programming applied to human resource planning for the Canadian armed forces.
3.3 Modeling the Officer Manpower System
The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP) describes the man-
power requirements of the active force of the Army. The AAMMP forms the basis
for the President’s budget and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The
AAMMP answers the fundamental Army manpower questions of how many com-
missioned and warrant officers, enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers will
be required, and an estimated number of soldier man-years and a forecasted end-
strength for the next two fiscal years of the President’s budget planning horizon
and the eight years of the POM planning horizon. The Army program encompasses
all aspects of Army funding. Interestingly, it was early work in building military
programs that gave their name to mathematical and linear programming.
The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Personnel, i.e. Army G1, has the
responsibility for developing the military manpower portion of the Army program.
This responsibility is carried out by four of the divisions of the Plans and Resources
directorate of the Army G1. The divisions of Plans, Compensation, and Strength
Forecasting are all responsible for portions of the inputs, which are assembled by
the Resources division.
Congress has the constitutional authority to raise an Army and as such pub-
lishes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) annually. The NDAA 2008
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established Army active duty end-strength, defined as the number of soldiers on
active duty on 30 September of a given year, at 525,400 soldiers and Army fund-
ing at $155.7 billion. In additional to end-strength restrictions, Congress provides
quarterly upper and lower strength bounds that serve to control or regulate the
man-years that will be executed each year.
In addition to the fiscal guidance contained in the NDAA, the Defense Offi-
cer Personal Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) contains guidance on the officer
portion of the services, and the Army in particular. One such piece of guidance
is a chart of allowances for field grade officers, i.e. majors, lieutenant colonels and
colonels, based upon the total number of officers on active duty. The requirements
keep a balance of approximately 5 %, 11% and 24% of the total Army commissioned
officers at the ranks of colonel, lieutenant colonel and major, respectively. The offi-
cer corps as a whole has traditional been limited to 15% of the total end-strength
or force structure.
When focusing on officer programming, the overall Army strength limits will
not constrain the officer system, while the DOPMA requirements will be constrain-
ing, and must be incorporated. However, most of the system constraints will be goals
or regulations imposed by the Army to control manpower. The current methodol-
ogy used by the Army G1 is to first determine the number of officers that will be
contained within the program by statistical analysis, and then to run a suite of
optimization and simulation models to determine the number, grade and specialty
of the enlisted force (Cashbaugh et al. 2007). In this respect, our model provides
additional analytic rigor by employing optimization for the officer force by grade
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and specialty. The second order effects of improved officer manpower forecasts are
realized as input provided to enlisted forecasting models.
3.3.1 Characteristics of the Army Manpower Program
The ten ranks of the commissioned officer corps are divided into 4 General
officer ranks, i.e. Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, General,
3 field grade ranks, i.e. Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and 3 company grade
ranks, i.e. Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant and Captain. The 4 General officer
ranks are tightly controlled and limited to 307 officers, a limit imposed by Congress.
Very little forecasting is need to estimate the General officer strength, as all General
officers, by virtue of promotion to General officer, share the same specialty. However,
the field grade officers, also bounded by Congress, are a large pool of manpower
which requires modeling to forecast their strength by grade and specialty. The rank
pyramid is structured so that there are approximately 16,000 MAJ, 9,600 LTC and
3,800 COL. The requirements for LT and CPT are 12,000 and 23,000, respectively,
with no distinction made between the 2LT and 1LT.
The Army uses branches to group officers into specialties. Further, the war-
fighting specialties are grouped into the Army Competitive Category (ACC), and
the Medical, Chaplains and Judge Advocate General, i.e. lawyers and judges, are
each grouped into their own subgroup. The ACC is divided into 43 specialties,
15 basic commissioning branches, 3 special operations branches and 25 functional
areas specialties. Not all specialties are required at lieutenant rank, and many of
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the functional area specialties are predominantly required at field grade ranks.
The challenge to adding specialty to this model is to avoid the “curse of di-
mensionally” while allowing for specialty modeling without an order of magnitude
increase in the state or decision space. A method to increase the fidelity without
enumerating the entire states space is to create a more detailed network structure to
describe rank states that contain additional time in service or system characteristics.
In this way, we aggregate officers which can be thought of as substitutes, either by
rank or specialty or time in service, to reduce the dimensionality of the state space.
The Army personnel databases contain many fields we might suggest for incor-
porating into a network model, e.g. rank, time in service, time in grade, assignment
history, education level, to efficiently model officer manpower we must chose some
subset of the available data. A model at the level of monthly projection, over six
grades, with fifty specialties, with 480 possible months of service, would result in
144,000 cells per period and assuming an eight-year projection horizon would result
in 1,152,000 cells. Modeling 60,000 officers with 144,000 potential cells would result
in a very high percentage of empty cells. Combining states which might be viewed
as substitutes over an annual time horizon can allow for a higher level of aggregation
without losing model fidelity.
To explain the structure of the force profile a little further, we will look to a
descriptive model based upon the Army’s yearly cohort structure. The three Army
commissioning sources are the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the United
States Military Academy at West Point (USMA), and Officer Candidate School
(OCS) produce between 4,000 and 6,000 officers annually. Officers are all assigned a
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year group, based upon the fiscal year in which they are commissioned. The USMA
officers have been in a training pipeline for 4 years, the ROTC officers from 2-4 years,
and the OCS officers for just under a year. These lead times all lend predictability
to officer accessions and credibility to a model based upon annual accessions goals
and cohorts.
3.3.2 Cohort Modeling
The Army pyramid structure and up-or-out policy requires fewer officers of
increasing tenure. Even with a four or five year commitment, some officers will be
allowed to leave the service early, and as such a cohort will never be as large as upon
entering. Early and late promotions can result in members of a year group holding
differing ranks, which can be accounted for by adjusting year groups, or maintaining
a separate data element for rank. One consideration in designing an optimal force
profile is to provide consistent or constant opportunities to each year group. This
complements the Army notion of fairness and supports the need to have a smoothly
aging Army.
The number of officers that choose to stay each year is expressed as a survival
distribution. The survival distribution is the probability of surviving to year n+ 1,
conditioned upon surviving to year n. These statistics are calculated annually and
aggregation of 30 year groups provides a the survival distribution for a given year.
A stationary survival distribution would suggest that the opportunities for each
year group of officers would remain relatively constant, as economic factors and
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force structure changes do provide variability in opportunities inside and outside
the Army and result in evolving survival distributions. Variability in the accession
cohorts subject to changing requirements and opportunities will provide an source













Figure 3.1: Officer Losses by Years of Service, FY 2001-07
Figure 3.1 displays seven historical loss distributions by years of service from
2001-2007. This data suggests a stationary distribution for losses by year group.
The sharp peaks in Figure 3.1 correspond to the ending of initial obligation for
officers between four and six years of service and retirement at 20 years of service,
the first point of retirement pension vesting. Either continuation distributions or
loss rates can be used to model force losses, and both methods have the advantage
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Figure 3.2: An Army Officer Force Profile, Number of Officers Remaining by Years
of Service
With support for the assumption of a stationary survival distribution, a pro-
jected accession cohort can be aged by the survival distributions to approximate the
size of the total force at steady state. In such a two-parameter model, the survival
probabilities and accession cohort can be adjusted to move the total force distri-
bution towards a desired distribution. Figure 3.2 represents a cohort force profile,
based upon 1988-89 continuation distributions and 5100 annual officer accessions.
Although 1988-89 might seem like an arbitrary timeframe to be chosen in 2008-2009,
it is the last time period when the Army was in something close to steady state. The
period of the 90’s was one of officer drawdowns after the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the end of the Cold War. The period since 2001 has been dominated by the Global
War on Terror (GWOT) and force structure growth. By combining an example of
steady state survival distributions with the current cohort planning figure, we gain
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some insight into a possible steady-state officer profile. The current planning figure
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Figure 3.3: Officer Loss Profile, Number of Officer Losses Per Year
Figure 3.3 displays the loss distribution for an individual cohort, implied by
the survival distributions from Figure 3.2. An Army at steady-state with cohorts
exhibiting this behavior would require 5100 new officers each year and requires 5100
losses, officers leaving the system, to achieve a stable distribution.
This type of cohort model requires rank to be added after the time in ser-
vice distribution has been determined, and this years-of-service distribution would
equate to 15102 LTs, 20343 CPTs, 15730 MAJs, 8054 LTCs and 2693 COLs, and a
end-strength of 61,924 officers under a 100% cohort promotion in primary zone of
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consideration assumption. Such a force could be maintained by a promotion policy
to have a field grade population in accordance with the DOPMA constraints for a
force between 60,000 and 65,000 officers. Under the assumption that officers would
comprise 15% of the total force, this would equate to 400 K to 435 K Active Army,
significantly less than the Congressionally mandated end-strength of 525,400 for FY
2009, for which this officer distribution comprise 12% the total force.
A prescription for promotion is not a integral component of the model, and
merely looking at the expected inventory based upon size of incoming cohorts as-
sumes the Army will be able to attain a steady state. It also does not incorporate
any additional information that might provide insight into determining which offi-
cers might be choosing to stay. Additional modeling fidelity based upon rank and
specialty will help to provide insight into the heterogeneity of the officer population.
3.3.3 Rank Modeling
A slightly different approach to discovering the optimal force profile is to first
partition the officer corps by rank. Whereas in cohort modeling aging is a natural
process, when partitioning by rank, promotion policies must be articulated to de-
fine transition probabilities. The traditional approach has been to model using a
network model such as Figure 3.4. A network flow model would be used to allow
for prescription of promotions and losses.
In an optimal force profile, losses and promotions should both be stationary
distributions. The network flow model lends to modeling losses as opposed to con-
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Figure 3.4: Network for Rank State Space
tinuation rates. At each time period, a subset of each rank will be chosen to be
promoted, and other subset designated as losses. When modeling by rank alone,
an upper bound or a combination of upper and lower bounds would be required to
describe promotion opportunities from state to state. Adding accessions at 2LT,




















Figure 3.5: Annual Officer Losses by Rank
Whereas Figure 3.1 supports the assumption of a stationary distribution over
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the cohort, over the same time period, Figure 3.5 does not appear to describe a
stationary distribution by rank. To gain modeling fidelity, we would like to combine
the two paradigms, that of modeling cohorts and rank. Using both rank and cohort
would result in 240 possible year of service and rank combinations. However, all
possible combinations are not feasible, and many do not add fidelity to our model.
In order to provide a model that will describe the current system and suggest
an optimal force profiles, we will aggregate in a different manner than previously con-
sidered in the literature. Combining rank, specialty, and cohort, we add additional
rank states to model the time spent in grade between promotions opportunities.
We are also able to aggregate all officers that have been passed over for promotion,
a measure of the robustness of a given force profile and the flexibility afforded to
manpower planners.
The network structure is shown in Figure 3.6. Starting with accessions in
state 1, and using natural aging and annual promotion opportunities, the accession
cohorts are distributed over the 29 states during their military career. States 3, 6, 7,
13, 20 and 26 represent states where personnel have been passed over for promotion
and strength can accumulate. When younger cohorts lack sufficient strength, these
states provided additional flexibility to the system. The on-time or due-course
promotions, e.g. 2-4, 19-21, have a lower bound on the promotion percentage from
these states, while the early promotions, e.g. 18-21, have a upper bound on the
promotion percentage. This limits the number of promotable officers in any given
model year and mirrors the way Army promotion boards consider officer cohorts.


































































Figure 3.6: Network for a 29 Rank State Space
Army promotion policy. The structure of Figure 3.6 captures all promotion states,
i.e. below the zone, in the zone and above the zone. This allows the targeting of
possible promotions at the states where they would be applied by Army policy. This
methodology allows the incorporation of specialty to the model using 1,247 states
per period, assuming 43 modeled specialties, as opposed to 7,740 per period required
to add time in service and specialty to Figure 3.4.
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3.4 A Linear Programming Officer Manpower Model
We describe a linear programming manpower model that exploits the net-
work structure in Figure 3.6 to capture rank and cohort fidelity while incorporating
specialty. This model allows the explorations of different controls to develop al-
ternative manpower plans to meet Army requirements. This is the first model in
the literature to incorporate officer individual specialty, while aggregating the total
officer demand from the requirements of the Personnel Management Authorization
Document (PMAD) over the planning horizon.
Each of the data elements and decision variables are in units of individuals.
Thus all elements of the objective function are in the same units, alleviating the
need for scaling in the objective function. The network structure and the smoothing
constraints work together to minimize end-effects, as will be seen in the numerical
results. Also, the model provides parameters to weigh the different portions of the
objective function as well as to prioritize ranks or specialties.
The model starts with a personnel stock vector describing the number of offi-
cers in the system. This personnel vector, X, is indexed by
g grade ∈ {1 . . . 29}
s specialty
t time ∈ {0 . . . T}
with t = 0 providing the initial starting conditions for the strength of the force.
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Thus the stock vector is Xs,g,t records the number of officers in specialty s at grade
g in time (or period) t. The initial personnel vector, X0 has dimension 29×43. The
final period of the projection horizon is represented by T , which will range from 2
to 9 years. Specialties are defined as listed in Figure 3.8.
The data or endogenous variables are
Ds,r,t PMAD
Ls,g,t losses.
The PMAD contains the Army force structure requirements has time dimension
equal to the projection horizon and the program will be run over increasing finite
time horizon, from two to nine years. The PMAD is indexed by specialty and rank,
r ∈ {LT, CPT, MAJ, LTC, COL}, which is mapped to grade, g, according to Figure
3.7. Losses, reflecting the decision of an officer to retire or resign their commission,
are empirically estimated for the first two years of the projection horizon from
84 months of data, capturing losses from 2001-2007 by grade and specialty. The
loss data was provided by PRS, and is graphically depicted in Figure 3.1. The
model requires the PMAD to be input over the entire planning horizon, but has the
flexibility to shape the force with reductions in all years for which estimated losses
are not provided.
The decision variables are accessions, promotions, and reductions. These con-
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Figure 3.7: Model Grade to PMAD Rank Mapping




Accessions are used both to indicate initial accessions at 2LT and any other
gains or additions to Xs,g,t. Reductions are used to decrement any Xs,g,t, in addition
to the losses entered as data, and the combination of an accession and a reduction,
Ai,g,t and Rj,g,t, represents a transfer from specialty s = j to s = i given grade g
and time in service t. The 43 Army specialties incorporated in the model are listed
in Figure 3.8.
The mathematical program is designed to minimize the absolute deviation
from the PMAD and to place smoothing controls on the spectrum of manpower
decisions. The objective function minimizes deviation from structure within spe-
cialty and minimizes the yearly changes in accessions, promotions and reductions.
The mathematical program’s objective function has three components, the first two
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Figure 3.8: Army Specialties
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|Ps,g,t − Ps,g,t+1| . (3.2)
With (3.1) and (3.2), a linear combination of operating strength deviation and the
variability of accessions, promotions and reductions, the weighting parameters γ, λ
and η can be adjusted to balance the contribution of each of the annual difference
in each of the manpower controls. In addition to the smoothing constraints, we
will minimize reductions, as reductions involve either reclassification of an officer, or
firing of an officer. Thus the third component of the objective function minimizing





The network structure from Figure 3.6 results in flow constraints ∀s ∈ Spe-
cialties across the projection horizon, t ∈ {1 . . . T − 1},
Xs,1,t+1 = As,1,t












Ps,j,t g ∈ {14, 21, 27}
Xs,g,t+1 = Xs,g−1,t − Ls,g−1,t −Rs,g−1,t + As,g−1,t g ∈ {8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24}




(Xs,j,t − Ps,j,t − Ls,j,t −Rs,j,t + As,j,t) g ∈ {13, 20, 26}




(Xs,j,t − Ls,j,t −Rs,j,t + As,j,t) .
The DOPMA constraints on field grade officer strengths are modeled as ∀t ∈


















which limit COL, LTC and MAJ to 5%, 11% and 24% of the total officer corps
for each period in the projection. Transfers are modeled using an accession and a
reduction pair at a given rank. All field grade accessions are transfers from another
specialty, and thus provide an additional lower bound on reductions ∀g ∈ {14 . . . 29}







Promotion constraints are modeled to allocate upper bounds to early promo-
tion states, and lower bounds to due-course promotion states. ∀s ∈ Specialties
across the projection horizon, t ∈ {1 . . . T},
Ps,g,t = 0 g ∈ {1, 4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29}
Ps,2,t ≥ 0.8Xs,2,t
Ps,g,t ≥ 0.7Xs,g,t g ∈ {5, 12, 19}
Ps,25,t ≥ 0.5Xs,25,t
Ps,g,t ≤ 0.1Xs,g,t, g ∈ {11, 18, 24} (3.4)
∀g ∈ Grades, and ∀s ∈ Specialties across the projection horizon, t ∈ {1 . . . T},
Ps,g,t ≤ Xs,g,t
requiring that the population must be larger than the number chosen for promotion.
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The next several constraints are properly categorized as goals. Initial officer




and distributed using a pair of bounds ∀t ∈ {1 . . . T}
0.75Xs,1,0 ≤ As,1,t ≤ 1.25Xs,1,0
which keep the annual accession mission for each of the branch within an acceptable












where α is a percentage fill requirement by rank and specialty. Losses are input
data for the first two years of the model horizon. The following years the reductions
variable allows the model to choose the optimal losses to achieve a steady state
distribution. The floors for losses were taken from the empirical distribution and
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The number of accessions adjust the total losses to account for transfers within
specialties. The last goal ensures the overall percentage of the Army End Strength




is kept below 15%.
3.5 Results and Programming Implications
The linear program is designed to produce an optimal force profile, subject to
all the constraints, in accordance with the stated objective function. This solution
is, however, a set of 29 x 43 dimensional objects, for each time period. The decision
variables of accessions, reductions, and promotions each prescribe a operational
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plan for manpower planners. The operational implications of such a profile, and the
acceptability of the solution, are dependent on the input data, as well as choices of
weighting functions and prioritization.
Table 3.1: OPL 6.1 / CPLEX 11.2 Run Data
The model was run over an increasing time horizon from two to nine years of
projection. Optimal objective function values are presented in Table 3.1 along with
model sizes and the running time on a Dell Optiplex GX 240 PC with a 1.70GHZ
Pentium 4 and 512 MB RAM. The optimization model code is presented in Appendix
B and was solved using CPLEX 11.2. The two-year projection solved in 13.39
seconds with 9842 variables and 7664 constraints, while the nine-year projection
required 35 minutes and 18.9 seconds to solve the model with 40, 754 variables and
30, 946 constraints. Figure 3.9 indicates that the solution time grows exponentially,
yet the growth in the objective function value, number of variables and constraints
grow linearly with increasing time horizon.
The structure of this experiment results in eight solutions for the first pro-
jection year, decreasing to only one solution for the ninth projection year. The
stability of the solution displayed with the increasing time horizon indicates limited
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Figure 3.9: Solution Time vs. Projection Horizon
end effects as the modeling horizon is increased. The multi-objective function and
smoothing constraints contribute to the stability of the model and will be further
explored in the following sections.
Looking at the value of the optimal objective function in Figure 3.10, the
intercept displays the cost of the misalignment of the force in the initial program
and the linear increase highlights the tradeoff between the smoothing constraints
and the deviation from structure over the increasing projection horizon.
Could the optimal objective function value be zero in steady state? If the
objective function was comprised of only (3.1) and (3.2), a perfectly aligned force
could have objective function value of zero. However, with the current formulation,
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Figure 3.10: Objective Value vs. Projection Horizon
the inclusion of (3.3) ensures that the objective function will be positive. First,
although reductions are minimized, there is a requirement for reductions as a part
of the Career Field Designation (CFD), a process of redistribution of company grade
officers into field grade specialties. This structural shift between CPT and MAJ will
necessitate some transfers, which in this formulation are composed of an accession
and a reduction. These logically should be loosely bounded from above by the
number of accession at 2LT in steady-state, as the steady state solution cannot
redistribute more MAJ each year than are accessed as 2LT.
Reductions are also floored at 3,295 and in steady state need to be at least
as large as accessions. Thus, although losses are floored at 3,295, they should be
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expected to be greater than 4,000, based upon yearly accessions. If steady-state
could be achieved with regard to perfect structure match, (3.1), and controls (3.2),
the formulation would require 3,295 losses plus the transfers required for the CFD
process, creating a feasible floor on the objective.
3.5.1 Changing Requirements
There are three general scenarios in which Army manpower planners find them-
selves: grow, maintain, or shrink the Army. With political pressure to reduce the
U.S. budget deficit, additional pressure is applied by DOD to all the services, and
the Army in particular, to reduce their budgets. The scenario described here is one
of initial strength that is greater than requirements, in the aggregate. The first year
accessions, i.e. initial accessions and transfers, in the two year model shown in Ta-
ble 3.3, indicate an initial misalignment. With only a two-year horizon, the model
has to use more force management controls to counter the large deviation between
the larger officer inventory and smaller requirements. As the horizon lengthens, the
solution becomes more stable, as evident from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3: the effect
of the smoothing constraints are apparent in both accessions and promotions.
The values of the smoothing parameters determine the relative weighting be-
tween the portions of the objection function values. As all the elements of the
objective function are in units of officers, we initially choose equal weighting. With
equal weighting, for the 2-8 year projections, each year’s promotions were identi-
cal as the model smoothed differences between annual promotions. In the 9 year
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Table 3.2: Forecasted Officer Personnel Promotions
Table 3.3: Forecasted Officer Personnel Accessions
projection, only the first year differed. Current constraints only penalize the one
year difference in promotions, and as such, the first year and the last year are only
included in one difference, encouraging the model to make changes in either the first
or last years of the projection. The agreement between year n, i.e. the last year of
the projection, and n − 1 at all time horizons is evidence of minimal end-effects in
promotions as the model horizon is increased. Rounding to units of officers, yearly
promotions do decrease with the increasing time horizon, indicating a move toward
steady-state distribution that requires fewer promotions than required in the near
term. This is consistent with the greater initial population than requirements.
Often in manpower optimization models the models solution will vary consid-
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erable between the n and n− 1 year of projection. This has made truncation of the
last several periods of a projection a popular method for addressing end effects. In
our model, we do not observe that nature of end effects. Rather, as the projection
horizon lengthens, we observe a change varying over the entire solution.
Values of several of the decision variables are presented in Tables 3.2-3.3. The
years of the projection are annotated on the left and the number of projection years
in the model run are recorded across the top of the table. The required officer







A, as shown in Table 3.4, they equate to the debits for each
year of the projection. Traditionally, losses are viewed as the number of officers that
exit the system. However, in this model we have both losses, statistically estimated,
and reductions, a decision variable. The comparision of Table 3.3 and Table 3.4
show a steady state 2LT accession mission of 4, 000 officers and equal losses to the
system. Table 3.2 displays promotions moving towards steady state. The stability
of the number of promotions in each projection year is also an indicator of the
effectiveness of the underlying network structure.
Table 3.4: Forecasted Officer Personnel Debits
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The accessions in Table 3.3 represent two components, transfers between spe-
cialties at higher grades, as well as initial 2LT accessions. Most of the accessions
are actually transfers, transfers from the CFD process as well transfers as to correct
structural imbalances. They are required by the lack of company grade positions in
many of the specialties as well as changing structural distribution of requirements
between branches. In this respect, even in a perfectly aligned force, there will be a
requirement for transfers between the company and field grade levels, as well as the
required accessions at 2LT.
3.5.2 Accessions
An annual debate centers around the number of accessions. If more new officers
are accessed than available jobs , only a portion of the formative years will be spent
in jobs directly relating to the officer’s specialty. When only a portion of the force
are able to have career enhancing jobs, or alternatively, each officer spends less of
their time in career enhancing jobs, job satisfaction declines. In the Army, declining
job satisfaction as a 1LT translates into higher CPT losses, as the initial four year
service obligation requires the majority of officers to serve until after their promotion
to CPT.
The distribution of accessions by branch is captured in Figure 3.11. Interest-
ingly, although only one year in the 9 year projection had accession different from
4000, year two at 5742, the distribution over the branches has considerable vari-
ability. The losses in different year groups and sizes of previous accession cohort
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changes the distribution over the branches in the second and following years. The
largest variability was in the largest combat arms branches, armor, infantry and
field artillery. These are the core jobs of the Army, and extra accessions in these
specialties are tied to higher field grade populations that can absorb variability.
Figure 3.11: Accessions by Branch for Each Projection Year
Current accession planning is focused at 5,100 accession annually (Haight and
Lewis 2008). However, our optimal force profile required only 4000 accessions in all
but the second year of the projection. One of the motivations for over accessing
is the shortages at higher ranks combined with the bar to lateral entry. However,
rather than over-accessing, another option is to find a way to commission or access
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at the point where the officers are needed. If the shortage is at CPT or MAJ, staff
positions could be identified that require more specialized non-combat skills and the
Army could directly hire against those positions. This would require a change to
the bar to lateral entry as well as cultural modification, but could ease shortages
at field grade ranks as well as properly sizing the 2LT and 1LT populations for the
structure.
Within the optimization, adjustment can be made to increase or decrease
accessions. One method is to increase the floor on accessions. The other is to add a
goal to the objective and penalize the difference from the goal. Another modification
that could be made to the optimization is to add rank substitutability constraints,
and in this way directly assess 2LT against field grade shortages. This however,
would require increasing the specialties to which initial accessions are authorized.
In this manner, if the Army were short Public Affairs Officers, a 2LT could be used
to replace a CPT or MAJ. Although counter to current Army culture, an argument
can be made for 2LT with advanced education or civilian experience to serve in
staff positions alongside MAJs. The teamwork of experienced MAJs in the Army
methods and traditions could be complemented by the specialized experience of




Optimization models can make use of the expected number of losses each
year, as well as cohort sizes, to choose optimal values of all the decision variables
simultaneously. Using loss numbers estimates in lieu of rates in the near term has
the advantage of incorporating additional information on retirements or resignations
that might be known to the manpower planner over a subset of the planning horizon.
Applying such techniques over the entire planning horizon would be susceptible to
small cell size problems and, using this approach, it would be increasing difficult to
maintain model feasibility over a longer planning horizon.
One of the obvious insights of this manpower model is more insightful than at
first glance. At steady state, losses must equal accessions. The interesting question
is where the losses should occur. By allowing the manpower model to allocate
losses past the first two years of the model, the optimal loss behavior is revealed.
Another modeling technique, that of rate-based losses, results in proportional losses
to cohort size. Although initially attractive, the assumption of proportional losses
may not hold when specialties are under-strength, i.e. increased availability of career
enhancing jobs, or over-strength. With our focus on finding an optimal force profile,
rather than prescribing all losses, we instead allow the model to prescribe where
losses should optimally be taken.
The choice to allow the model to determine losses was an attempt to reach
a steady-state solution in the process of finding an optimal force profile. Over the
horizon of the President’s Budget, the first two years of the projection, the manpower
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Figure 3.12: Branch Losses/Debits by Projection Year
planners have very few tools to change an officer’s behavior or shift the behavior of
an entire year-group. Following the same line of reasoning, over the entire POM, the
Army has more control to influence loss behavior. The Army has just implemented
a bonus system to affect just such a change in the entire cohort behavior for CPTs in
the 1999-2004 cohorts (Haight and Lewis 2008). Additional policies can be invoked
to exert more control over loss rates over a longer planning horizon which could be
implemented in the final years of the POM.
Our focus on finding an optimal force profile also motivated the choice of
modeling CFD as a combination of an accession and a reduction, allowing the model
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to prescribe where the officers should be taken from to fill the increasing number of
specialties at the field grade level. Figure 3.4 illustrates both higher losses in the
first year of the model due to the misalignment with structure, but also indicates
the branches, e.g. infantry, field artillery, that must provide a large portion of the
officers required for CFD process.
3.5.4 Promotions
Figure 3.13: Branch Promotions by Projection Year
Model promotions provide a glimpse of the viability of the different career
paths. Where Table 3.2 displays that the model finds steady-state promotions in
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the aggregate, Figure 3.13 displays the distribution of promotions across specialties.
Increasing promotions in a specialty would indicate a specialty in which there is
growing opportunities, where decreasing promotions would indicate the over sat-
uration of the specialty. The distribution indicates that the optimization found
a solution that has a healthy distribution of promotions across the initial entry
branches.
Figure 3.14: Rank State Promotions by Projection Year
Another approach to examining the promotion prescription is to look at the
distribution across the states that are eligible for promotions. Figure 3.14 displays
the opportunity for early, due-course and late promotions. The largest promotions
are in the due-course promotions, i.e. states 2, 5,12, 19, 25, as expected. These
97
states all have a proportionally defined lower bounds, (3.4), to ensure that due-course
promotions meet the Congressional guidance within DOPMA. The promotions in
late promotion states, especially 13, indicate where additional promotions could be
shifted to early promotions. The early promotions in described in states 11, 18, and
24, have an upper bound in the formulation, while the model has the most flexibility
in the late promotion states.
3.5.5 Force Profiles
Figure 3.15: Force Profile for Projection Year 1
The force profile for the first, fifth and ninth year of the 9 year projection
are displayed in Figures 3.15-3.17. The company grade component of the force has
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three semi-absorbing states, i.e. 3, 6, 13. Interestingly, both states 3 and 6, the last
promotions to 1LT and CPT, tend towards zero. However, state 13, the CPT passed
over for MAJ, grows throughout the horizon. This suggests that promotion rates to
MAJ have considerable flexibility, due to the pool of available manpower in state
13, but also indicates that there is a significant demand at CPT, and as a result the
model has not chosen eliminate these passed over officers though a reduction. This
optimal company grade structure suggests opportunities for direct assignment at
the company grade level to make up for the shortage in manpower that the model
identifies across the model horizon which results in the growth in state 13. This
interesting disconnect between requirements at the company grade and field grade
structure is apparent in the optimal solution, but much more difficult to identify
solely though structure documents.
At the field grade levels, both state 20 and state 26 decrease from higher
populations in the initial population. The populations in the COL states are very
stable, maintaining a stable distribution over states 27, 28 and 29. It is an interesting
result from this model that the proposed structure is stable across all ranks, with
the exception of CPT. The middle grades are always the most challenging for the
Army, and the model clearly indicates a need for additional manpower. The possible
alternative of direct assignments at CPT could smooth the flow between 1LT and
MAJ and appears a viable alternative.
After examining the characteristics of these optimal force profiles, constraints
can be updated, additional constraints can be added, and objective function weight-
ings revisited. One suggestion that is not supported by this research, is the need
99
Figure 3.16: Force Profile for Projection Year 5
for longer field grade careers for Army officers. This would be characterized in the
model as increasing populations at states 20, 26 and 29, which is not evident in the
model. Alternatively, the research supports offering incentives to ensure that CPTs
continue to serve only to the promotion window for MAJ. The Army has considered
bonuses to get officers to stay until they reach MAJ. This research suggests that an
optimal Army force profile contains a large number of officers passed over for MAJ.
This could be achieved by modifying the retirement vesting policies to incentivize a
higher portion of CPTs to stay in the Army until the 10-year point and increasing
the competition for promotion to MAJ.
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Figure 3.17: Force Profile for Projection Year 9
3.6 Future Work
The purpose of this research was to create a model to explore the optimal
force profile for the U.S. Army. As such, the solution should approach a steady-
state distribution and allow enough fidelity that modification to the optimal policy
can be achieved by modifying weighting on the objective function and constraints,
or by shifting goals from constraints to the objective function.
The process of shifting the employment of this model from a tool to suggest an
optimal force profile to a forecasting tool is one of adjusting weighting and objectives
until manpower analysts are satisfied with the forecasts of the model. The model is
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built with the flexibility to change deviations from structure by rank and specialty,
or by the 29-state grade and specialty, as well as changing the weighting of each of
the force management levers. In addition, constraints, e.g. DOPMA or total force
officer percentage, can be easily shifted into the objective function to transition from
constraints to goals. This model can be extended by changing the projection horizon
from annual to either quarterly or monthly projections by applying a distribution
to the annual accession mission, and estimating losses over the shortened time step.
The model also provides a formulation stable enough to be modified for use
in answering policy questions involving additional stochastic elements. Alternative
force structures can be compared as well as different potential loss profiles to iden-
tify strengths and weaknesses of potential courses of action and solutions that are
optimal over a distribution of possible future structures.
One possible extension of this manpower model is a principle agent model,
making use of a model of individual behavior and this manpower model to explore
differences in ability and natural sorting. The common network structure upon
which the models in this chapter and the previous chapter are built would facilitate
integration and provide possible insight into potential distributions of ability at
the field grade ranks based upon different promotion, signaling and compensation
policies. Several potential policies changes could be explored to ensure that the
aggregate optimal personal decisions agree with a system optimal policy.
This is the first linear programming model for Army manpower to incorporate
specialty over the entire planning horizon. We were able to achieve this though a new
network structure that focused on time in grade rather than modeling time in service
102
as has been previously implemented in models focusing on enlisted manpower. The
limited end effects and stability of this model make it an excellent candidate for
extension and inclusion into the suite of models employed by the Army G1.
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Chapter 4
Gradient Estimation and Mountain Range Options
4.1 Introduction
Simulation and gradient estimation research have found a fertile ground in
financial engineering applications. Often the pay-out function for complex securities
and derivatives do not permit a closed form analytical solution, and therefore must
be priced by Monte Carlo simulation or other numerical methods.
This chapter focuses on developing gradient estimates for a relatively recent
form of options known as mountain range products. These products were first
introduced by Société Générale in 1998 and have a mixture of the characteristics of
basket options, barrier options and other path dependent options (Quessette 2002).
We will first look at pricing several mountain range products and then turn to
gradient estimation in order to complete calculation of the Greeks, whose derivation
can be critical to hedging these products.
As we calculate the Greeks, we will examine indirect gradient estimation, path-
wise or Infinitesimal Perturbation Analysis (IPA), and Likelihood Ratio/ Score Func-
tion (LR/SF), to include evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each method.
We will look to prior work on calculating the Greeks for Asian options, barrier op-
tions, and basket options for insight into efficient gradient estimation for mountain
range products.
104
We find that IPA and LR/SF methods are efficient methods of gradient esti-
mation for Mountain Range products at a considerably reduced computation cost
compared with the commonly used indirect methods, e.g. finite differences or bump-
ing, which provide biased estimators and are less effective at estimating the deriva-
tives for these products. We also find that the most commonly calculated Greek,
delta, has value zero by construction in models of Mountain Range options where
the stock process is driven by multiplicative distributions.
We will proceed by first introducing gradient estimation in a stochastic simu-
lation setting, and provide a worked out example for European call options. Section
4.3 will explain the mountain range products and we then develop gradient estima-
tors for Everest and Atlas options in Section 4.4. We close with a numerical example
in Section 4.5 and results in Section 4.6.
4.2 Gradient Estimation
The price of each the mountain range options is dependent upon the various
parameters of the model. Calculating the derivatives of each function with respect
to the parameters of interest will result in better understanding of how sensitive
each option is to system changes, and will be accomplished by gradient estimation.
Fu and Hu (1995) first applied gradient estimation techniques to option pricing
focusing on IPA estimation for both European and American options. Broadie and
Glasserman (1996) applied both IPA and LR/SF methods to European and Asian
options. Within financial engineering, Glasserman (2004) has become the standard
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reference. For broader application, Fu (2006) provides an detailed survey of gradient
estimation within stochastic simulation and explains how the direct techniques are
much more efficient than “brute-force” finite difference methods. Fu (2008) provides
a more gentle introduction with a focus on application to option pricing.





Often θ appears in the performance measure, but is may also be introduced though
the random variables of the system. Assuming we lack detailed information concern-
ing the distribution of J , we turn to simulation as an effective technique to estimate
the distribution of J(θ). We carry out a large number of independent trials and
calculate the sample performance L, applying the law of large numbers to justify
using the sample mean to estimate
J(θ) = E[L(θ)] = E[L(X1, X2, ..., Xn)] (4.1)







where FL is the distribution of L and FX is the distribution of the input random
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variables X, can assist in illuminating the importance of the different forms of θ
dependence.









where f is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of X, provide two different
integral representations, highlighting a structural difference in the forms of θ de-
pendence. The θ dependance can be path-wise from the input random variables, as
shown in (4.3), or in the distribution or measure of the input random variable FX ,
as in (4.4).
Gradient estimation seeks to estimate
dE[L(θ)]
dθ
and we will describe indirect methods before addressing direct methods: IPA and
LR/SF.
4.2.1 Indirect Methods
Indirect methods can can be used for sensitivity analysis or simulation opti-
mization. An intuitive approach corresponds to the notion of the derivative and
changing the value of the parameter “a little” and observing the change in the
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performance measure. A one-sided forward difference is the most straightforward
implementation, but can have a large variance and results in a biased estimator.
With ei, the unit vector in the ith direction, and ci, the scalar perturbation in the
ith direction,
Ĵ(θ + ciei)− Ĵ(θ)
ci
(4.5)
expresses a forward difference gradient estimator. Choosing a very small ci can result
in noisy estimators, but larger values results in increasing bias of the estimator,
which illustrates the trade off between variance and bias motivating the a priori
choice of ci. This method is referred to as bumping a parameter in finance, e.g.
bumping the spot. The forward difference estimator requires a second simulation of
the same dimension as the initial simulation.
A slightly more sophisticated approach is the two-sided symmetric difference
Ĵ(θ + ciei)− Ĵ(θ − ciei)
2ci
, (4.6)
which has increased accuracy over (4.5), making use of a central difference approx-
imation. A two-sided estimator requires two additional simulations whereas (4.5)
requires only one additional simulation: the increased accuracy comes at the price
of increased computational burden.
An additional gradient estimation technique designed for stochastic approxi-
mation is the simultaneous perturbation estimator. Where the first two methods
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are well suited for sensitivity analysis, the simultaneous perturbation estimator is
especially well suited to simulation optimization, such as making small changes to
several positions simultaneously, e.g. in an investment portfolio optimization using
simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation. Letting ∆ be a d-dimensional
vector of perturbations, the simultaneous perturbations estimator is
Ĵ(θ + c∆)− Ĵ(θ − c∆)
2ci∆i
. (4.7)
A slight modification, the random directions gradient estimator, shifts ∆ into the
numerator and results in a estimator,
(Ĵ(θ + c∆)− Ĵ(θ − c∆))∆i
2ci
, (4.8)
which allows the use of the normal distribution for the perturbation sequence (Fu
2006).
Where (4.5) and (4.6) are well suited to sensitivity analysis, analyzing the
change to the performance measure when only one item has changed, the simulta-
neous changes in (4.7) and (4.8) help speed convergence in simulation optimization.
4.2.2 Direct Methods
Where all indirect methods require additional simulations to estimate the gra-
dient, direct methods exploit the structure of the performance measure and stochas-
tics of the system to calculate the derivative estimate directly during the initial
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simulation. Returning to (4.1) we examine the dependance on the parameter θ and

















When the θ dependence occurs in the input random variable as seen in (4.3),
pathwise estimates can be employed. When the θ dependence occurs in the distri-
bution (measure) of the input random variable FX as in (4.4), the likelihood ratio
method is appropriate.
4.2.2.1 Pathwise
Pathwise estimates require integrability conditions which are easily satisfied
when the performance measure is continuous with respect to the given parame-
ter. Two different notions of derivatives will be necessary for implementing direct
















X(θ + ∆θ, ω)−X(θ, ω)
∆θ
w.p.1.
The family of random variables parameterized by θ are defined on a common prob-
ability space such that X(θ) ∼ F (·; θ) s.t. ∀θ ∈ Θ, X(θ) is differentiable w.p.1.
Assuming the interchange of differentiation and expectation is permissible, by



























, which can be asserted by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence
Theorem.
4.2.2.2 Likelihood Ratio















d ln f(x; θ)
dθ
f(x)dx
and the estimator is
L(x)
d ln f(x; θ)
dθ
,
where d ln f(x;θ)
dθ
is the score function of statistics.
4.2.3 European Call Example
We calculate the sensitivities for European Call options to changes in spot
(delta) and volatility (vega) as an illustrative example. The payoff of the European
Call struck at strike K which expires at T , with a risk free interest rate of r is
VT (K) = e
−rT (ST −K)+ (4.13)
where (·)+ represents max(·, 0). This is the standard hockey stick payoff which is
always continuous with respect to the value of ST , the value of the stock at expiry.
A standard Brownian motion is a stochastic process, Wt, where W0 = 0 and
t→ Wt is continuous on [0, T ] w.p.1 and has independent increments Wt−Ws which
are distributed N(0, t− s) or equivalently Wt −Ws has mean 0 and variance t− s.
A stochastic process St is a geometric Brownian motion if log(St) is a Brownian
motion with initial value log S0. In the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the price of
the underlying stock, St, follows geometric Brownian motion and therefore has a
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lognormal distribution for any fixed t.




with Wt, a standard Brownian motion. With a dividend yield of δ, spot (initial or
current stock price) S0, volatility σ, and drift µ replaced by r − δ,
St = S0e
(r−δ−σ2/2)t+σWt
represents the risk-neutral dynamics of the stock price. Letting Z represent a stan-





The price of the Europen Call, CT (K), is the expected value of the discounted
payoff under the risk-neutral measure, Q,
CT (K) = E
Q[VT (K)] = e
−rTEQ[(ST −K)+]. (4.15)
The price of a European Call has a closed-form solution, which is presented along
with Monte Carlo price estimates from 10, 000 sample paths in Table 4.1, for a stock
with S0 = 90, 100 and 110, K = 100, r− δ = 0.07, volatility, σ = 0.25, and T = 0.2.
Calculation of the standard errors, as reported in Table 4.1 requires additional code
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and is contained in Appendix B.
4.2.3.1 Pathwise
We will first illustrate calculating vega, dVT
dσ
, by the pathwise method of gra-









From the stock dynamics in (4.14), we calculate
dST
dσ





















Next we evaluate dVT
dST
, by taking the derivative of (4.13) with respect to ST . As
(4.13) is equal to zero when ST ≤ K, VT is only sensitive to changing values of ST
when ST ≥ K, which can be captured by
dVT
dST
= e−rT1ST≥K , (4.17)








































The LR/SF method requires the differentiation of the distribution of the stock
path. The first step to implementing this method is finding the distribution of X,
the stock path. To find the distribution, we express the stock path from (4.14) as a





















and calculate the Jacobian
∣∣∣∣dg−1(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ = 1xσ√T .




































To find the LR/SF estimator for vega, assuming the order of integration and









Simplifying using the identity df
dσ











and we find the LR/SF estimator for vega to be
e−rT (x−K)+d ln f(x)
dσ
. (4.19)
Using the distribution (4.18), the score function of (4.19) can be implemented in
simulation by











or by substituting r̂ = r − δ

















To find the LR/SF estimator for delta changes the score function from (4.19) to
e−rT (x−K)+d ln f(x)
dS0














From the results in Table 4.1, we observe that the IPA estimate is closest
to the true value of delta and vega at each spot. We also observe that the bump
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Table 4.1: European Call Options Gradient Estimation
estimate is closer to the true value for delta than LR/SF, but LR/SF is closer to
the true value for vega. The IPA has smaller standard errors than the LR/SF for
each estimate. The effectiveness of the bump method for calculating delta might
suggest the extra work to calculate direct gradient estimators is unnecessary, but
the method is clearly less effective at calculating vega. We will show that it is also
much less efficient at estimating the gradients for mountain range options.
4.3 Mountain Range Options
Very little has been written about mountain range options. Quessette (2002)
describes several new exotic derivatives to include the mountain range options. He
discusses the additional risks involved in products that are traded over-the-counter
as well as the importance of understanding the model sensitivities and importance
of model calibration. Vega stability, sensitivity of price to the volatility of the stock,
as well as forward skew and multi-underlying skew issues are discussed, but compu-
tational details are not provided. This discussion of different modeling techniques
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resulting in different prices highlights the model dependence in exotic derivatives.
Overhaus (2002) details the Himalaya options, explaining many of the different po-
tential payoff functions and highlighting the main difficulty in pricing such products:
correlation of the stocks within the basket. A basket is the term used to annotate
a set of stocks upon which an option is based. By grouping stocks into a basket, it
is possible to aggregate performance of multiple assets while reducing transaction
costs. Overhaus (2002) suggests finite difference methods for calculation of delta,
sensitivity to spot, but acknowledges that discontinuities occurring as stocks exit
the basket will be problematic. He suggests measure changes can be used to de-
velop more robust gradient estimates, but does not provide details. Meaney (2007)
expands the treatment of Himalayan options by looking at volatility smile. He
proposes a mixture of densities technique to gain greater fidelity in the volatility
modeling of Himalayan options, providing a two-stock example.
Several of the mountain range products have path dependencies, e.g. Altiplano
and Himalayan, while all are variations on basket options written on the level of the
returns. As each of the following products are traded over-the-counter, each payoff
must be modeled to match the individual contract that has been written, but the
following payoff formulations capture the general flavor of each option variety.
4.3.1 Everest
Mount Everest is the highest point on earth and in the Himalayan Mountain
range. Curiously, the Everest option is the pay-out on the worst performer in a
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basket, normally of 10-25 stocks, with 10-15 year maturity (Quessette 2002).









Atlas was a figure in Greek mythology that supported the world on his back.
The Atlas option is a call on the mean of a basket of stocks, a basket that has some
of the best and worst performers removed (Quessette 2002). The number of stocks
at the top and bottom of the basket to be removed can be varied.
To properly describe the Atlas option, we need to introduce the notion of order























} and Rt(i) is the ith smallest return, so that Rt(1) ≤
Rt(2) ≤ . . . ≤ Rt(n). The Atlas option removes a fixed number of stocks from the bas-
ket with n1 and n2 detailing the number of stocks to be removed from the minimum
and maximum of the ordering. Given two numbers n1, n2 where n1 + n2 < n, and n









For example, a strike of K = 1 would be in the money when the average of the
remaining stocks in the basket had a return of at least 1. Likewise, a K = 1.1 would
be in the money when the average of the stocks remaining in the basket increased
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in value by 10% over the period.
4.3.3 Altiplano/Annapurna
Altiplano is the highest plateau outside of Asia, located in the central Andes in
South America and Annapurna is a mountain range in the Himalayas. The Altiplano
pays a coupon if none of the stocks in the basket hits or goes above a certain level
before expiration. In the event that one or more stocks hits the critical level or
barrier, the Altiplano is a call option on the basket of stocks. When the limit is a
floor rather than a ceiling for the stocks in the basket, the option is an Annapurna.
Given n stocks S1, S2, . . . , Sn in a basket, a coupon amount, C, a limit L, and















The payoff for the Altiplano option will be discontinuous, having a jump when
any of the stocks in the basket hits the barrier. Each of the parameters of these
options, e.g. the coupon, level, strike, are all in units of returns. Imagine if the
option coupon would pay 1.05, with L = 1.05 and K = 0. The Altiplano option
would have a continuous payoff which would be constant until a stock had a positive
return, at which time the Altiplano would jump to pay-out based upon the returns
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in the basket. Unless all the stocks in the basket simultaneously broke the upper
limit, the value of the basket would decrease in price. As K increases, the pay-out
in this option would have a larger drop as a stock breaks the boundary. Likewise,
with a C = 0.5, and K = 0.5 with boundary at L = 1, the option would decrease
in value as the stocks hit the boundary. With the three variables, a wide variety of
payoffs can be constructed, which will be discontinuous w.p.1.
4.3.4 Himalaya
The Himalayan mountain range contains all the 8,000+ meter peaks on Earth.
The Himalayan option is a call option on the average of the maximum performer in
the basket each period. Each period, the top performer is removed from the basket,
and its return over the last period is paid as a coupon. The option can be created
so that the number of periods are equal or less than the number of stocks in the
basket (Overhaus 2002).
To describe the removal of stocks from the basket, we will introduce additional
set notation. We will define the set of returns from the stocks in the basket, and
then incrementaly decrease the number of returns remaining in the basket to be












i∗1 = arg maxR1















continuing until i∗n is chosen from a set Rn which only contains a single element.





, . . . RTi∗n}.




















if locally floored. In locally floored options, each coupon is positive by construction,
and results in higher payoff than the globally floored option. In both of these
representations, by construction, R
tj
i∗j
is the highest performing stock during the
time interval (t0, tj] remaining in the basket. Alternatively, the option could pay a
coupon based upon the highest performing stock over the preceding time interval
(tj−1, tj], as opposed to paying all returns from time t0. When the Himalayan option
is constructed to pay on only a subset of the assets in the basket, the locally floored
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respectively, with M < n.
The Himalayan option can be constructed using the many different features
highlighted here to provide a complex set of payoffs. The defining feature of a stock
exiting the basket each period will make the payoff discontinuous with respect to
the stock prices and stock returns in the basket.
4.4 Derivation of Gradient Estimators
To describe the basket of stocks of interest and to price each of the mountain
range options will require multi-dimensional processes. To further explore these
Mountain Range options, we will derive IPA and LR/SF estimators in the Black-
Scholes-Merton model of geometric Brownian motion. Of the Mountain Range op-
tions, the Everest and Atlas both have continuous payoff functions, making them
suitable for IPA, as well as LR/SF gradient estimation. We will derive IPA and
LR/SF gradient estimators for these two of the Mountain Range options.
We define the correlated multi-dimentional geometric Brownian motion diffu-
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sion model by a system of stochastic differential equations,
dSi(t)
Si(t)
= αidt+ σidWi(t), i = 1, 2, ..., n (4.23)
where Wi(t) is a standard one-dimentional Brownian motion. Defining the correla-
tion between Wi(t) and Wj(t) as ρi,j, we create a covariance matrix, Σi,j = ρi,jσiσj.







Thus we can replace the drift αi with r− 12σ
2
i and simulate the risk-neutral dynamics
of the stocks in each of the Mountain Range options by





j=1 AijZk+1,j . (4.24)
4.4.1 Everest Options Sensitivities
From the Everest option payoff function (4.20), we can notice the lack of a
strike and the payoff based upon a minimum return of the stocks in the basket.
When pricing under the risk-neutral measure, a change in measure ensures that
the martingale condition on the stock price process is satisfied. If the final price
of a stock STi is such that it has the minimum return in the basket, any change
in STi will change the valuation of the basket, until the point where it no longer
has the minimum return, at which point a different stock, STj would be the new
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minimum. The payoff is thus a continuous and monotonically non-decreasing linear
function of STi while it is minimum, and therefore will be a piecewise linear function
of the stocks in the basket, with a potential kink at each point when the stock with
minimum return changes.








































and a sufficient condition for the interchange of differentiation and expectation is


















the Everest option has a delta equal to zero with respect to each stock in the basket.









which clearly shows that the price of the Everest option has no dependence on the
initial spot of the stocks in the basket under geometric Brownian motion, and also














































































































































For the LR/SF gradient estimator, we need the payoff and the score function.
The payoff function can be viewed as coming for free, as any simulation of the
price of the Everest option will require implementation of the payoff function. In
addition, once we determine the score function, it is also a reusable component,
allowing straightforward computation of LR/SF gradient estimates for options with
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d ln f(ST1 , S
T





as the form of the LR/SF gradient estimator. According our model of stock dynam-
ics, (4.23), returns are log-normally distributed,
STi ∼ exp(X)
X ∼ N(µ(θ), TΣ), (4.25)
and the score function will be the derivative of (4.25) with respect to the parameter
of interest. The score function is
d ln f(ST1 , S
T










For vega, rho and Theta, with µi = logS
0
i + (r − 12‖Σi‖









= r − ‖Σi‖
2
2
The score function will be used in the LR/SF gradient estimator for each of the
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4.4.2 Atlas Options Sensitivities
The Atlas option has the interesting feature of trimming both the highest and
lowest performers in the basket and then incorporating a strike on the average of























The differentiability of the Atlas option will mirror the Everest Option, except that




However, this is a point, so (4.21) is differentiable w.p.1. Implementing the gradient



























































The LR/SF gradient estimator makes use of the same score function developed












4.4.3 Altiplano, Annapurna and Himalayan Option Sensitivities
IPA will not be applicable for gradient estimation for Altiplano, Annapurna
and Himalayan options. We discussed removing the discontinuity in the derivative
at K for the Atlas option, and the same holds here. However, the barrier option
characteristics of the Altiplano/Annapurna option and the changing basket size of
the Himalaya option both make the IPA estimator biased, as the price paths are
discontinuous. Even though these options do not have continuous price paths, the
LR/SF gradient estimator will still be applicable.
For the Altiplano/Annapurna option, the three parameters of strike, coupon
payment, and barrier level all add to the complexity of this option. With the
combination of C = 1, K = 4, and L = 1, on a basket of 4 stocks, the option
would pay a coupon value of 1, unless the return of any of the stocks went above 1
during, at which point the option would pay the return over 4 for the entire basket.
Interestingly, the coupon payment can set so that the payment has either a positive
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or a negative jump upon hitting the boundary.
The Himalayan option will have also have a discontinuous payoff as each period
a stock is removed from the basket. However, a strength of the LR/SF gradient
estimator is that once the proper pricing algorithm has been implemented, the score
from the derivative of the measure can be combined with the pay-out from any
option to complete the LR/SF estimator.
4.5 Numerical Example
We conducted a series of experiments by Monte Carlo simulation to price
Everest, Atlas, Annapurna, and Himalaya options. Each of the experiments was
conducted on a four stock basket. The correlation of the stocks in the basket was
estimated from physical correlation, using 256 days of data from 1 June 2006 though
8 June 2007 provided by the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The selected
stocks are from the financial sector, Citigroup Inc. (C), Freddie Mac (FRE), J.P.
Morgan Chase and Company (JPM) and Lehman Brothers (LEH), and each of the
stocks had a zero dividend yield over the period. The values used in the simulation
are displayed in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Table 4.2: Simulation Stock Parameter Values
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Table 4.3: Simulation Covariance Matrix Values
4.5.1 Mountain Range Greek Estimates
First we implemented the Everest Option over a one-year time horizon, with
the risk-free rate set at 4%. We simulated 10,000 paths, calculated direct gradient
estimates, central difference (CD), and forward difference (FD) estimates for vega,
rho and theta. The results of the IPA and LR/SF estimators are provided in Table
4.4. The IPA estimators had small standard errors, and agreed with the results
from CD and FD. The LR/SF agreed with the IPA and indirect methods for all but
theta. The standard errors for each of the estimators were an order of magnitude
less than the estimated value.
Table 4.4: GBM Everest Option Gradient Estimation
Similar results to those from the first experiment were observed for the At-
las options. Once again, we simulated 10,000 paths, calculated direct gradient
estimates, central difference estimates, and forward difference estimates. We set
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K = 1.0, n1 = 1 and n2 = 1, so the Atlas option was an option on the two remain-
ing stocks in the basket, simulated over a one-year horizon.
In vega estimates, LR/SF and IPA produced similar results to CD and FD.
LR/SF, FD, and CD were all within standard errors for the estimate of rho, and
IPA, FD and CD were all within standard errors for estimates of theta. The LR/SF
tended to have larger standard errors than the other methods, but the ease of
implementation and wider applicability are the benefits of this direct method.
Table 4.5: GBM Atlas Option Gradient Estimation
When estimating the Greeks for the Atlas and Everest options, the CD and FD
methods produced similar results. The additional simulations required for estima-
tion of these indirect gradients with a priori choice of step size did result in similar
estimates. To calculate the CD with 10,000 stock paths cost an additional 20,000
simulations per calculated Greek, for a total of 120,000 additional stock paths. In
the next section we will address the difference in step size and the errors for the CD
method.
The next two options, Annapurna and Himalaya, are both path dependent
and have discontinuous payoffs, and consequently the IPA method is not applicable.
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Once again, we simulated 10,000 paths, calculated LR/SF gradient estimates, central
difference estimates, and forward difference estimates, however, we simulated the
monthly stock price for a four month period.
Table 4.6: GBM Annapurna Option Gradient Estimation
For the Annapurna option, we set the boundary level, L = 0.75 and the coupon
payment, C = 0.75. The strike, K = 4.0, was set such that the option would be in
the money if the sum of returns were positive on average. In all of the estimates,
the LR/SF estimate was considerably lower than the CD and FD estimates. The
apparent discrepancy between the CD/FD and LR/SF for the Annapurna could
result from either over estimation by CD/FD or under estimation by the LR/SF
due to the pathwise dependence in the payoff structure, but we have yet to explain
this discrepancy.
The Himalaya gradient estimates are displayed in Table 4.7. For the payoff
function we used a local floor, as described in (4.22), and included each of the four
stocks over the four month period of the option. The estimates agree for three of the
four stocks vega estimates and theta but the LR/SF estimates for rho were smaller
than the CD and FD estimates.
134
Table 4.7: GBM Himalaya Option Gradient Estimation
In all of the Greeks for these path-dependent options, the CD and FD esti-
mates agreed. However, the implementation for the CD and FD required significant
additional coding. The implementation of the LR/SF requires two lines of code for
each Greek in addition to required code to calculate the price of the option. For
the Annapurna option, when calculating each of the indirect options, an additional
overhead is incurred to calculate if any of the perturbed values broke the lower
limit. For the Himalaya option it is required to keep track of which stocks have
been removed from the basket on each perturbed price path required to calculate
each Greek.
The additional modeling complexity is an additional cost above and beyond
the the additional 20,000 simulations per calculated Greek. In pricing European
options, the calculation of CD and FD estimates are trivial, but the complexity
increases dramatically when pricing Mountain Range options. In addition, the a
priori choice of step size may will require a tradeoff between bias and variance, and
the step choices that are consistent with the model variables may not result in the
lowest standard errors. In the next section we will address the difference in step size
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and the errors for the CD method.
4.5.2 Central Difference Errors
The standard errors for the Everest and Atlas options displayed in Figure 4.1
and Figure 4.2. These results agree with the tradeoff between bias and variance:
smaller step size has larger errors but smaller bias (Fu 2006). When deciding upon
a step size for the CD estimate, a starting guess would be based upon the order of
magnitude of the parameter. For an interest rate of 0.04 or a volatility of 0.15, a
guess of 0.001 would seem to be consistent with the model parameters. These step





















Figure 4.1: Standard Errors for Differing Step Sizes for Everest Options
Looking at the standard errors for the path dependent options provides insight
into the important of the choice of step size. Using the same logic presented before,























Figure 4.2: Standard Errors for Differing Step Sizes for Atlas Options
than necessary. As seen in Figure 4.3, the change in error from 0.01 to 0.0001
is increasing as expected. However, the smallest step sizes have unexpectedly low
standard errors. In addition, as shown in Figure 4.4, the direction of the change
in the value of the estimated Greek with a smaller step size is not consistent. The
value of vega at different step sizes is very stable, where the value of theta varies
considerably with smaller step sizes.
The standard errors for the Himalaya options are shown in Figure 4.5. The
errors show similar behavior with the errors for the Annapurna options. However,
the estimated values of the Greeks are more stable for the Himalaya option than for
the Annapurna option. In both options, the value of theta decreased when a smaller
step size was selected.
When pricing vanilla options, the computational complexity of the FD and CD

















































Figure 4.4: Differing Step Sizes for Annapurna Options
these indirect estimators results in additional modeling complexity, in addition to the
additional simulation costs. After adding the additional modeling complexity and
the uncertainty concerning the proper step size to the additional simulations required




















































Figure 4.6: Differing Step Sizes for Himalaya Options
4.6 Results and Future Work
We found that the Mountain Range options provide an interesting example
of efficient use of gradient estimation in a pricing context that lacks a closed-form
solution and requires Monte Carlo or another numerical estimation technique to
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price the asset. We derived IPA estimators that accurately and efficiently estimated
the gradients for Atlas and Everest options. Our results have shown that when IPA
is applicable, it is the gradient estimate technique of choice for Mountain Range
options.
The ease of implementation and mathematical simplicity makes indirect gra-
dient estimation an attractive technique, but these methods can have very high
variance and are known to result in biased estimators. Moreover, an additional
120,000 sample paths beyond the 10,000 needed to price the option itself are re-
quired to implement central and forward difference for the six Greeks estimated for
these Mountain Range options. In addition to the increase in model complexity for
the path-dependent options, there is an increased simulation cost for any implemen-
tation of indirect gradient estimators. As the number of Greeks needed increases,
direct gradient estimators become the clear choice for Mountain Range options.
The commonality of each of these options is the payoff based upon return
rather than stock level. Many options, e.g. spread, Asian, European, American,
pay off on the basis of the level of the stock. However, for any options that rely
on returns, estimates of delta based upon geometric Brownian motion and other
multiplicative process will be a constant, 0.
We explored an application where Monte Carlo simulation is required in order
to price the options, and direct gradient estimation provide an efficient technique
for gradient estimation. This work has illuminated several additional research ex-
tensions. First, we could compute results for additional models of stock dynamics.
Looking at models with variable volatility would be well suited to exploration by
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simulation. We would look at gradient estimates for Lévy and Variance Gamma
processes. Also, exploring the differences between simulation of non-multiplicative
models and our current results would add to the understanding of Mountain Range
options.
Additional work in creating weak derivative estimates could compare results
for lognormal distributions with the results from the normal distribution (Fu 2006).
In addition, developing weak derivative estimators provide another comparison mea-
sure for LR/SF when IPA is not applicable. The research could also be extended
by examining hedging strategies for these options, to determine if Mountain Range
options can be perfectly hedged by static or dynamic positions. Any of the Greeks




OPL Code for Army Officer Specialty Model
/*********************************************
* OPL 6.1+.1 Model
* Author: ahall
* Creation Date: Nov 13, 2008 at 3:22:52 PM
*********************************************/
//Data
{string} Specialties = ...;
{string} Ranks = ...;
int NbPeriods = ...;
int NbStates = ...;
int NbLTS = ...;
int Nb2LTS = ...;
int NbProjection = NbPeriods -1;
range Periods = 1..NbPeriods;
range Projection = 1..(NbPeriods - 1);
range Difference = 1 ..(NbPeriods - 2);
range Rank_States = 1.. NbStates;
range FG = 8..NbStates;
range LTS = 1..NbLTS;
range SLT = 1..3;
range FLT = 4..6;
range CPT = 7..13;
range MAJ = 14..20;
range LTC = 21..26;
range COL = 27..29;
int X[Rank_States][Specialties] = ...;
int D[Projection][Ranks][Specialties] = ...;














// Penalize all ranks OSD
sum(p in Projection, s in Specialties)abs(sum (r in 1..6)Personnel[p+1][r][s]
- D[p]["1LT"][s])+
sum(p in Projection, s in Specialties)abs(sum (r in 7..13)Personnel[p+1][r][s]
- D[p]["CPT"][s])+
sum(p in Projection, s in Specialties)abs(sum (r in 14..20)Personnel[p+1][r][s]
- D[p]["MAJ"][s])+
sum(p in Projection, s in Specialties)abs(sum (r in 21..26)Personnel[p+1][r][s]
- D[p]["LTC"][s])+





abs(sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Accessions[d][s][r]-




abs(sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Promotions[d][r][s]-
sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Promotions[d+1][r][s])
+
// Minimize Reductions




abs(sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Reductions[d][r][s]-







forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][1][s] == 0;
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][4][s] == 0;
forall (r in 7..10, s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][r][s] == 0;
forall (r in 14..17, s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][r][s] == 0;
forall (r in 21..23, s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][r][s] == 0;
forall (r in 27..29, s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][r][s] == 0;
// In the Zone Promotions
forall(s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][2][s] >= (0.8)*Personnel[p][2][s];
forall(s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][5][s] >= (0.7)*Personnel[p][5][s];
forall(s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][12][s] >= (0.7)*Personnel[p][12][s];
forall(s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][19][s] >= (0.7)*Personnel[p][19][s];
forall(s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Promotions[p][25][s] >= (0.5)*Personnel[p][25][s];
// Below the Zone Promotions
forall (s in Specialties, y in Projection)
Promotions[y][11][s] <= (0.10)*Personnel[y][11][s];
forall (s in Specialties, y in Projection)
Promotions[y][18][s] <= (0.10)*Personnel[y][18][s];
forall (s in Specialties, y in Projection)
Promotions[y][24][s] <= (0.10)*Personnel[y][24][s];
forall (r in Rank_States, s in Specialties, y in Projection)
Promotions[y][r][s] <= Personnel[y][r][s];
// Constraints: Personnel
// Aggregate flow constraints
// FY 08 Constraints - Initial Conditions
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forall (s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)
Personnel[1][r][s] == X[r][s];
// Projection Flow Constraints
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][1][s] == Accessions[p][s][1];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][2][s] == Personnel[p][1][s] - Losses[p][s][1]
- Reductions[p][1][s];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][3][s] == Personnel[p][2][s] + Personnel[p][3][s]
- Promotions[p][2][s] - Promotions[p][3][s] - Losses[p][s][2]
- Losses[p][s][3]- Reductions[p][2][s]- Reductions[p][3][s];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][4][s]== Promotions[p][2][s] + Promotions[p][3][s];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][5][s] == Personnel[p][4][s] - Losses[p][s][4]
- Reductions[p][4][s];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][6][s] == Personnel[p][5][s] + Personnel[p][6][s]
- Promotions[p][5][s] - Promotions[p][6][s] - Losses[p][s][5]
- Losses[p][s][6]- Reductions[p][5][s] - Reductions[p][6][s];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][7][s] == Promotions[p][5][s] +
Promotions[p][6][s] + Accessions[p][s][7];
forall (r in 8..11, s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][r][s] == Personnel[p] [r-1][s]-
Losses[p][s][r-1]- Reductions[p][r-1][s]
+ Accessions[p][s][r-1];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][12][s] == Personnel[p][11][s] -
Promotions[p][11][s] - Losses[p][s][11]
- Reductions[p][11][s] + Accessions[p][s][11];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][13][s] == Personnel[p][12][s] +
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Personnel[p][13][s]- Promotions[p][12][s]
- Promotions[p][13][s] - Losses[p][s][12] -
Losses[p][s][13]- Reductions[p][12][s]
- Reductions[p][13][s] + Accessions[p][s][12] + Accessions[p][s][13];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][14][s] == Promotions[p][11][s] + Promotions[p][12][s] +
Promotions[p][13][s];
forall ( r in 15..18, s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][r][s] == Personnel[p][r-1][s] -
Losses[p][s][r-1]- Reductions[p][r-1][s]
+ Accessions[p][s][r-1];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][19][s] == Personnel[p][18][s] - Promotions[p][18][s]
- Losses[p][s][18]- Reductions[p][18][s] + Accessions[p][s][18];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][20][s] == Personnel[p][19][s] + Personnel[p][20][s]
- Promotions[p][19][s] - Promotions[p][20][s] - Losses[p][s][19] -
Losses[p][s][20]- Reductions[p][19][s]- Reductions[p][20][s]
+ Accessions[p][s][19] + Accessions[p][s][20];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][21][s] == Promotions[p][18][s]
+ Promotions[p][19][s] + Promotions[p][20][s];
forall (r in 22..24, s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][r][s] == Personnel[p][r-1][s]
- Losses[p][s][r-1] - Reductions[p][r-1][s]
+ Accessions[p][s][r-1];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][25][s] == Personnel[p][24][s]
- Promotions[p][24][s] - Losses[p][s][24]
- Reductions[p][24][s] + Accessions[p][s][24];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][26][s] == Personnel[p][25][s]
+ Personnel[p][26][s]- Promotions[p][25][s]
- Promotions[p][26][s] - Losses[p][s][25] -
Losses[p][s][26]- Reductions[p][25][s]-
Reductions[p][26][s] + Accessions[p][s][25] + Accessions[p][s][26];
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forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][27][s] == Promotions[p][24][s] + Promotions[p][25][s] +
Promotions[p][26][s];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][28][s] == Personnel[p][27][s] - Losses[p][s][27] -
Reductions[p][27][s] + Accessions[p][s][27];
forall (s in Specialties, p in Projection)
Personnel[p+1][29][s] == Personnel[p][29][s] +
Personnel[p][28][s]- Losses[p][s][28]
- Losses[p][s][29] - Reductions[p][28][s]- Reductions[p][29][s] +
Accessions[p][s][28] + Accessions[p][s][29];
// DODMA Field Grade Requirements
forall (p in Projection)
sum (s in Specialties, r in 27..29)Personnel[p+1][r][s] <= 0.05 *
sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Personnel[p+1][r][s];
forall (p in Projection)
sum (s in Specialties, r in 21..26)Personnel[p+1][r][s] <= 0.11
* sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Personnel[p+1][r][s];
forall (p in Projection)
sum (s in Specialties, r in 14..20)Personnel[p+1][r][s] <= 0.24
* sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Personnel[p+1][r][s];
// ***********************************************************************
// Goals: Accession bounds
forall ( y in Projection)
sum (s in Specialties) Accessions[y][s][1] >= 4000;
forall (y in Projection, s in Specialties)
Accessions[y][s][1] <= 1.25*X[1][s];
forall (y in Projection, s in Specialties)
Accessions[y][s][1] >= 0.75*X[1][s];
// Goals: Minimum Fill Constraints
forall (p in Projection, s in Specialties)
sum (r in 1..6)Personnel[p+1][r][s] >= 0.5 * D[p]["1LT"][s];
forall (p in Projection, s in Specialties)
sum (r in 7..13)Personnel[p+1][r][s] >= 0.5 * D[p]["CPT"][s];
forall (p in Projection, s in Specialties)
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sum (r in 14..20)Personnel[p+1][r][s] >= 0.5 * D[p]["MAJ"][s];
forall (p in Projection, s in Specialties)
sum (r in 21..26)Personnel[p+1][r][s] >= 0.5 * D[p]["LTC"][s];
forall (p in Projection, s in Specialties)
sum (r in 27..29)Personnel[p+1][r][s] >= 0.5* D[p]["COL"][s];
// Reduction in Force Toggle
forall (r in FG, p in Projection)
sum( s in Specialties)Reductions[p][r][s] >=
sum(s in Specialties)Accessions[p][s][r];
// Losses
forall (p in Projection)
sum(s in Specialties, r in SLT)Reductions[p][r][s]
+ sum(s in Specialties, r in SLT)Losses[p][s][r] >= 87;
forall (p in Projection)
sum(s in Specialties, r in FLT)Reductions[p][r][s]
+ sum(s in Specialties, r in SLT)Losses[p][s][r] >= 260;
forall (p in Projection)
sum(s in Specialties, r in CPT)Reductions[p][r][s]
+ sum(s in Specialties, r in CPT)Losses[p][s][r]
- sum(s in Specialties, r in CPT)Accessions[p][s][r] >= 1462;
forall (p in Projection)
sum(s in Specialties, r in MAJ)Reductions[p][r][s] +
sum(s in Specialties, r in MAJ)Losses[p][s][r]
- sum(s in Specialties, r in MAJ)Accessions[p][s][r] >= 466;
forall (p in Projection)
sum(s in Specialties, r in LTC)Reductions[p][r][s]
+ sum(s in Specialties, r in LTC)Losses[p][s][r]
- sum(s in Specialties, r in LTC)Accessions[p][s][r] >= 652;
forall (p in Projection)
sum(s in Specialties, r in COL)Reductions[p][r][s]
+ sum(s in Specialties, r in COL)Losses[p][s][r]
- sum(s in Specialties, r in COL)Accessions[p][s][r] >= 368;
// Percentage of Total Force
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forall(p in Projection)
sum(s in Specialties, r in Rank_States)Personnel[p+1][r][s]
<= 0.15 * 525400;
};
execute OUTPUT {
var ofile = new IloOplOutputFile("Plan10lpc.csv");
for (var w in Projection){
for (var x in (SLT)){
for (var y in Specialties){





for (var w1 in Projection){
for (var x1 in (FLT)){
for (var y1 in Specialties){





for (var w2 in Projection){
for (var x2 in (CPT)){
for (var y2 in Specialties){





for (var w3 in Projection){
for (var x3 in (MAJ)){
for (var y3 in Specialties){





for (var w4 in Projection){
for (var x4 in (LTC)){
for (var y4 in Specialties){
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for (var w5 in Projection){
for (var x5 in (COL)){
for (var y5 in Specialties){









C++ Code for European Call Options
double stock_process(double Z, double spot, double vol, double T){
double next;
next = spot*exp((rate - 0.5 *sig1*sig1)*T)*exp(sqrt(T)*vol*Z);
return next;
}
Figure B.1: C++ Implementation of geometric Brownian Motion
double Euro_price(int sim_limit)
{
for(sim_num = 0; sim_num < sim_limit; ++sim_num)
{
uniform1 = mcg(); uniform2 = mcg();
Z1 = boxmuller(uniform1, uniform2);
stock1 = stock_process(Z1, spot1, sig1, h);




Figure B.2: Monte Carlo Call Option Price
151
delta +=((stock1 > K) ? exp(-rate*h)*(stock1/spot1) : 0)/sim_limit;
vega +=((stock1 > K) ? exp(-rate*h)*(stock1/sig1)*(log(stock1/spot1)
- (rate + 0.5*sig1*sig1)*h) : 0)/sim_limit;
Figure B.3: C++ Implementation of IPA estimators
delta_LR +=((stock1 > K) ? exp(-rate*h)*(stock1 - K)
*(log(stock1/spot1) -delta_d)/(spot1*h*sig1*sig1) : 0)/sim_limit;





Figure B.4: C++ Implementation of LR/SF estimators
double boxmuller(double rand_u1, double rand_u2)
{
double R; double V;
R = - 2 * log(rand_u1);
V = 2 * 3.141592653589793 * rand_u2;
gauss1 = sqrt(R)*cos(V); gauss2 = sqrt(R)*sin(V);
return gauss1;
}
Figure B.5: Box-Muller Algorithm for generating Normal Random Variates
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